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GUNS AND SPEECH TECHNOLOGIES: HOW THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS AFFECTS COPYRIGHT REGULATIONS OF
SPEECH TECHNOLOGIES
Edward Lee*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the possible effect the Supreme Court's landmark Second
Amendment ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller will have on future cases
brought under the Free Press Clause.' Based on the text and history of the Constitu-
tion, the connection between the two Clauses is undeniable, as the Heller Court
itself repeatedly suggested. Only two provisions in the entire Constitution protect
individual rights to a technology: the Second Amendment's right to bear "arms"
and the Free Press Clause's right to the freedom of the "press," meaning the printing
press. Both rights were viewed, moreover, as pre-existing, natural rights to the
Framing generation and were separately called during the Framing the "palladium
of liberty" and essential to "the security of freedom in a state." The development
of both concepts traces back to the abuses of the Crown in disarming the populace
and restricting the printing press in England. During the seventeenth century, the
people in England were deprived of both technologies-in the case of the printing
press, by the copyright holders of the period known as the Stationers' Company,
which conducted warrantless searches to seize unauthorized presses with the
backing of the Crown. The Bill of Rights was enacted to stop these abuses in the
new Republic. Both clauses developed in direct reaction to the perceived threat of
government restrictions on the respective technologies. Given this historical
connection, the analysis of the Second Amendment in Heller may provide a useful
point of reference for the Court in future cases interpreting the Free Press Clause.
Just as Heller held that banning handguns for the purpose of gun control violates the
Second Amendment's core protection of the right to possess arms for self-defense,
banning speech technologies for the purpose of copyright control violates the Free
Press Clause's core protection of speech technologies for self-expression.
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Many
thanks to David Goldberger, Peter Shane, Marc Spindelman, and Peter Swire for their com-
ments on earlier drafts. I also appreciate the help of Doug Berman, Joshua Dressler, and
Alan Michaels in discussing aspects of this Article. Tamara Maynard provided excellent
research assistance; Katherine Hall, invaluable reference support from the Michael E.
Moritz Law Library.
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INTRODUCTION
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court defined, for the first time
in 217 years of the Second Amendment's existence, an individual right to keep and
bear arms for self-defense purposes.2 This landmark decision settled, once and for all,
the lingering question of whether the Second Amendment recognizes a general right
to bear arms for all individuals, or instead limits such right only to the context of a
militia. In a 5-4 decision, the Court opted for the broader interpretation and struck
down D.C.'s gun control law that barred individuals from owning handguns in D.C.3
The Heller decision will likely have ramifications that are far-reaching.4 A day
after the Heller decision, the National Rifle Association (NRA) filed five different
lawsuits against gun control laws in San Francisco, Chicago, and three Chicago sub-
urbs, to extend the Court's ruling to the states through the doctrine of incorporation
and to test the constitutionality of other gun control laws. 5 Only a month later, Dick
Heller, the same plaintiff in the Second Amendment lawsuit, filed a constitutional
2 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
3 Id. at 2821-22.
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, SecondAmendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV.
L. REv. 246, 249 (2008) ("[I]t is stunning to see that Heller is a thoroughly originalist
opinion- a significant development, and one that is at least potentially important for the
future, certainly of the Second Amendment, and perhaps more generally.").
' Press Release, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n Inst. for Legislative Action, NRA Files Second
Amendment Lawsuits in Illinois and California Following Supreme Court Ruling (June 27,
2008), available at http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Read.aspx?ID=4053; see Complaint,
NRA v. City of Chicago, No. 08-cv-3697 (N.D. I11. June 27, 2008), available at http://www
.nraila.org/media/PDFs/chicago.pdf; Complaint, NRA v. Village of Oak Park, No. 08-cv-
3696 (N.D. Il. June 27, 2008), available at http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/oakpark.pdf;
Complaint, NRA v. Village of Morton Grove, No. 08-cv-3694 (N.D. 1M. June 27, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/morton.pdf. The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, feeling bound by prior Seventh Circuit precedent, ruled that the Second
Amendment did not apply against the states because it was not incorporated under the Four-
teenth Amendment. NRA v. Village of Oak Park, Nos. 08-C-3696, 08-C-3697, 2008 WL
5111163, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4,2008) (citing Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d
261, 269 (7th Cir. 1982)), appeal docketed, Nos. 08-4241, 08-4243, 08-4244 (7th Cir. Dec.
5, 2008). The Heller Court itself avoided reviewing the "continuity validity" of its 1875 prec-
edent Cruikshank, which held that the Second Amendment was not incorporated. See Heller,
128 S. Ct. at 2813 & n.23 (discussing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)).
On Nov. 4, 2008, the NRA filed a Second Amendment challenge to a Washington state
law that requires aliens to obtain a special firearm license, even though the state agency refuses
to grant such licenses to aliens. Paul Shukovsky, Washington Sued Over Firearm License Law,
SEATTLE POST-INTELIGENCER, Nov. 4, 2008, at B3, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource
.com/1ocal/386392_guns05.html.
The San Francisco Housing Authority settled the case against it and repealed a regu-
lation forbidding individuals in public housing from possessing a gun. See NRA Settles San
Francisco Housing Authority Gun Ban Lawsuit, http://www.nraila.org/legislation/read.aspx
?id=4305 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
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challenge to D.C.'s newly revised gun control law that banned semiautomatic hand-
guns capable of shooting more than twelve shots without manual reloading.6 The
Heller Court itself recognized that future litigation may arise to test permissible
exceptions to the Second Amendment right, which the Court concluded "is not un-
limited.",7 As the Court emphasized,
[N]othing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-
standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.
That admonition did nothing to deter subsequent Second Amendment challenges to
laws forbidding gun ownership by those convicted of felonies 9 or misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence.' Although virtually all of these challenges have been
rejected thus far, the stream of cases with similar challenges continues unabated."
6 See Posting of Lyle Denniston, to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/new-
second-amendment-case-in-dc/ (July 28, 2008, 5:31 EST).
7 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
I d. at 2816-17.
9 See, e.g., Range v. Indiana, No. 3:08-CV-435 (JVB), 2008 WL 4852679 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 6,2008); United States v. Lippman, No. 4:02-cr-082, 2008 WL 4661514 (D.N.D. Oct. 20,
2008); United States v. Borgo, No. 1:08-CR-81,2008 WL 4631422 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 17,2008);
United States v. Whisnant, No. 3:07-CR-32, 2008 WL 4500118 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30,2008);
United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008);
United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 WL 2937742 (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2008);
see also United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08-CR- 118, 2008 WL 4534226 (W.D.N.C.
Oct. 6, 2008) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a federal law prohibiting illegal
alien from possessing firearms); United States v. Yancey, No. 08-cr-103-bbl, 2008 WL
4534201 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2008) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a federal law
prohibiting unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing firearms).
0 United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163--64 (D. Me. 2008).
" See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868,874 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Machine guns are
not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the
category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual
use."); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (rejecting a challenge
to a federal law banning possessing firearms while under a domestic violence restraining order);
United States v. Potter, No. CR07-5683RBL, 2008 WL 4779744 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31,2008)
(rejecting a challenge to the crime of possessing firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking).
A few challenges have been successful in the context of bail conditions. Two district
courts have held facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause a provision of the
Adam Walsh Act that requires that, "as a condition of release on bail, an accused person
[who is charged with possessing child pornography] be required to surrender his Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm without giving that person an opportunity to contest
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While Heller no doubt changes the landscape of gun control laws, the most far-
reaching effect the decision may have is-hard to imagine-in the area of copyright
law. Yes, copyright law. My suggestion may seem baffling to many legal scholars
at first, but a close analysis of the history of the Second Amendment and of the Free
Press Clause, as well as the Court's own discussion in Heller, establishes a close con-
nection between the two. Indeed, of all the provisions in the Constitution, the Framers
included only two specifically to protect technologies by name: "arms" in the Second
Amendment and the "press," referring to the printing press in the First Amendment's
Free Press Clause, which was added to the Constitution to prevent, in part, Congress
from exercising its Copyright Clause power in a way that restricted the printing
press. 2 Remarkably, only two technologies were considered so essential to liberty
to merit express, constitutional protection during the founding of the Republic: guns
and speech technologies.
This Article explains how the Heller decision may call into serious question
Congress's ongoing attempts to regulate speech technologies under copyright law.
To date, the Court has not had occasion to review the constitutionality of a copyright
restriction on a speech technology under the Free Press Clause, so the case law in
this area stands very much as the case law regarding the Second Amendment did pre-
Heller: underdeveloped. But as Congress contemplates imposing even further re-
strictions on speech technologies through copyright law in our digital age, the Court
will almost certainly have to consider a free press challenge to such a restriction in
whether such a condition is reasonably necessary in his case to secure the safety of the com-
munity." United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590,603 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see United
States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2008). These cases turned on the in-
fringement of the defendant's Second Amendment right without procedural due process.
A few cases have recognized the Second Amendment right as offering some potential
protection in the particular context of the legal dispute. See, e.g., Lund v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
No. 2:07-CV-0226BSJ, 2008 WL 5119875, at *7 n.9 (D. Utah Dec. 4, 2008) ("By itself,
mere possession of a firearm in public is not unlawful and may well represent the exercise
of a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution (recognizing the 'individual right of the
people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes,' subject to the power of the Legislature to define
the 'lawful use of arms.')."); Jennings v. Mukasey, No. 6:08-cv-833-Orl-31GJK, 2008 WL
4371348, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2008) (recognizing a viable Second Amendment claim
with respect to application of federal prohibition on possession of firearms by a person con-
victed of misdemeanor domestic violence crime that was later expunged); United States v.
Kitsch, No. 03-594-01, 2008 WL 2971548, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2008) ("A statute that
imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of an enumerated constitutional right despite
defendant's reasonable belief in good faith that he has complied with the law must, at the
very least, raise constitutional doubts. Post-Heller, the Government's desired construction
of Section 922(g)(1) imposes just such a burden on defendants who, for whatever reason,
reasonably believe that they are not felons within the statutory definition.").
12 U.S. CONST. amends. I & II.
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the near future. And if the Court interprets the Free Press Clause in a manner parallel
to the way it has interpreted the Second Amendment-as the Court itself suggested in
Heller-Congress's attempts to restrict or ban speech technologies under copyright
law will very likely be deemed unconstitutional. Just as bans on guns that serve the
purpose of self-defense violate the Second Amendment, bans on technologies that
serve the purpose of self-expression violate the First Amendment's Free Press Clause.
Part I provides a brief summary of the Heller decision and its interpretive method,
which defined the "core protection" of the Second Amendment from an originalist
or historical point of view at the time of the Framing. Part II explains the textual and
historical connection between the Second Amendment and the Free Press Clause, the
only two clauses in the Constitution that protect an individual right to a technology.
The histories followed a remarkably similar path in reaction to the abuses of the
Crown in restricting both arms and printing presses in England. Indeed, the core
abuse in both cases was the Crown's depriving the people of the technology itself.
Part III explains why Heller can provide a helpful point of reference for the Court in
reviewing the constitutionality of restrictions on speech technologies under the Free
Press Clause. Part IV concludes by examining several copyright restrictions on speech
technologies under the Free Press Clause, as interpreted under a "core protection"
framework analogous to Heller. The Article suggests that the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992 (AHRA) and Congress's proposed "broadcast flag" bill both violate a
core protection of the Free Press Clause, while the anti-circumvention provision of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) probably does not.
I. HISTORY AND HELLER: SELF-DEFENSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
Before drawing the historical connection between the Second Amendment and
the Free Press Clause, it is important to spend a few moments on the lengthy Heller
decision itself. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, holding that individuals
have a Second Amendment right to bear arms for the core purpose of self-defense.
13
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer both wrote dissents, concluding that the Second
Amendment right was limited to maintaining a "well-regulated militia.' ' 14 Breyer also
proposed an "interest balancing" test for the Second Amendment. 5 Although the
majority and dissent reached different interpretations, their methods for interpreting
the Second Amendment (apart from Breyer's discussion of interest balancing) were
fairly similar at least in one important respect--both examined Framing-era historical
sources to determine what the words in the Second Amendment originally meant at
the time of the Framing or to the Framers. Although scholars can dispute how
13 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
14 Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2009] 1041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"originalist" Heller really was, the main arguments of the majority and, even to a
large degree, the dissent were fixated on determining the history and original meaning
of the Second Amendment.'
6
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia began with a close textual analysis of the words and structure of
the Second Amendment and attempted to discern its original meaning at the time of
the Framing: "In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that '[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.""
'i 7
The majority examined a variety of textual and historical elements to support its
analysis, including: (1) the relationship between the operative clause ("the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"), which the majority found
to be controlling, and the prefatory clause in the Second Amendment ("A well regu-
lated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State"), which the majority inter-
preted to be a nonlimiting statement of a purpose of the Amendment; (2) references
to "the people" in other parts of the Constitution as used to define an individual right;9
(3) contemporaneous dictionary definitions of "keep," "bear," and "arms" suggesting
that such terms--either individually or collectively-were not limited to the context
of state militias;20 (4) historical legal commentaries, such as Blackstone, using such
terms;2' (5) state constitutions at the time of the founding;22 and (6) the historical
background of the right to bear arms for self-defense tracing back to England.23
The majority doubted the value of Justice Stevens's reliance "on the drafting
history of the Second Amendment-the various proposals in the state conventions
and the debates in Congress." 24 In the majority's view, "[i]t is dubious to rely on such
history to interpret a text that was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right,
rather than to fashion a new one."' Why the codification of a pre-existing right ver-
sus a new right makes somehow "dubious" a court's consideration of the legislative
6 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 250 ("Justice Scalia's thoroughly originalist opinion com-
manded a majority of the Court, and Justice Scalia's distinctive brand of originalism, involving
the original public meaning, was clearly ascendant. Indeed, the dissenters, spoke in largely
originalist terms as well, although Justice Breyer's plea for balancing had pragmatic as well
as originalist elements.").
'7 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,731 (1931)).
IS Id. at 2789-2800.
19 Id. at 2790 & nn.5-6.
20 Id. at 2791-97.
21 Id. at 2792, 2798.
22 Id. at 2793-94.
23 Id. at 2797-99.
24 Id. at 2804.
25 Id.
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history of a constitutional amendment, Justice Scalia did not say. For example, even
if a right was pre-existing, the comments of the Framers, First Congress, and/or state
ratifiers could provide confirmation of the "pre-existing" nature of the right as per-
ceived by those who drafted or ratified the Second Amendment. In any event, the
majority assumed that such legislative history was relevant, but concluded that it did
not support the dissent's view. 26 And, as discussed in Part II below, Justice Scalia made
extensive use of the historical debate between the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists
during the ratification of the Constitution to support the majority's interpretation.
After analyzing the history of the Second Amendment, Scalia concluded that the
"core protection" of the Amendment is to protect the individual's right to bear and
keep arms for the "core lawful purpose of self-defense., 27
B. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens wrote the primary opinion for the four dissenting justices on
the meaning of the Second Amendment. 28 Although not known as an originalist as
Justice Scalia is, Stevens also relied heavily on the text and historical materials to
discern the original understanding of the Second Amendment. But, in contrast with
Justice Scalia's search for the "original public meaning" of the text at the time of the
Framing (sometimes called the "New Originalism" or "public meaning originalism"), 29
Justice Stevens searched for the "Framers' intent" or purpose in enacting the Amend-
ment.3° Justice Stevens also made greater use of the legislative history of the Second
Amendment, including various state proposals and the debates in Congress.31 This
legislative history was secondary, however, to Stevens's primary argument that the
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2818, 2821.
28 Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 92-93 (2004) (distinguishing original meaning versus original intent); Gary Lawson
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006)
("The reasonable American person of 1788 determines, for 1788 and today, the meaning of
the federal Constitution. Thus, when interpreting the Constitution, the touchstone is not the
specific thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people-whether drafters, ratifiers,
or commentators, however distinguished and significant within the drafting and ratification
process they may have been-but rather the hypothetical understandings of a reasonable person
who is artificially constructed by lawyers.").
30 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The contrast between those two
declarations and the Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose announced
in the Amendment's preamble. It confirms that the Framers' single-minded focus in crafting
the constitutional guarantee 'to keep and bear arms' was on military uses of firearms, which
they viewed in the context of service in state militias.").
31 Id. at 2830-36.
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Court's precedent in United States v. Miller32 already resolved the issue in favor of
a militia-based interpretation of the right to bear arms.33
Despite these differences, both the majority and the dissent were searching for
some notion of original meaning underlying the Second Amendment based on its
text, structure, and history. Justice Stevens examined: (1) the relationship between
the operative clause and the prefatory clause, which the dissent believed established
the limiting purpose of the Second Amendment (for "[a] well-regulated Militia");-"
(2) various state Declarations of Rights contemporaneous with the Declaration of
Independence that spoke of the importance of a "well-regulated militia"; 35 (3) the mean-
ing of "right of the people" and other references to "the people" in the Constitution;
36
(4) the meaning of "to keep and bear Arms" by reference to contemporaneous dic-
tionary definitions and uses of "arms" in state military laws;37 and (5) the connection
between the Second Amendment and Article I's Militia Clauses as indicating an intent
of the Framers to prevent Congress from disarming state militias.38
Although Stevens drew a different conclusion from these textual and historical
sources than the majority, he engaged the debate at the same level the majority did:
the historical time period of the Framing and some notion of the original meaning
of the Second Amendment.39
C. Importance of Text, History, and Original Meaning of the Second Amendment
Constitutional law scholars will likely debate, for years to come, the interpretive
approach of the Heller Court and its general significance for all of constitutional law.4
Plenty of prominent constitutional law scholars have already engaged that debate,
post-Heller---critiquing and at times criticizing the Court's decision.4' Some historians
32 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 2824-25.
31 Id. at 2824-25 & nn.5-6.
36 Id. at 2827.
37 Id. at 2828-29.
38 See id. at 2831-36.
31 Justice Stevens disputed the majority's reliance on the seventeenth century Bill of Rights,
Blackstone's Commentaries, and post-enactment commentary on the Second Amendment, all
of which the dissent believed "offer[ed] little support for the Court's conclusion." Id. at 2837.
4' See, e.g., Larry Solum, Heller and Originalism Part I: Introduction to the Series,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG, June 28, 2008, available at http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/
2008/06/heller-and-the.html.
41 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 145 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 4; Mark Tushnet, Heller and
the New Originalism, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author); J. Harvie
Wilkinson, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming
1044 [Vol. 17:1037
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question the accuracy of the Heller Court's historical account.42 This Article does not
join that larger debate, however, or evaluate the merits of the Heller decision, its his-
tory, or its reasoning. Whether the Heller case was "rightly decided," or whether it has
significance for constitutional jurisprudence generally, I leave for others to analyze.
This Article takes Heller as a starting point, or, in other words, as binding Second
Amendment precedent (one that the Court is unlikely to overrule or disavow any time
soon). Although the Court has dealt with the Second Amendment on a few occa-
sions before, those cases did not provide much analysis of the historical origins of the
Amendment, let alone the entire scope of the right to bear arms, notwithstanding the
Heller dissent's assertions to the contrary.4 3 After years of ambiguity, Heller finally
resolved a fundamental question about the basic nature of the Second Amendment right.
Taking Heller as a starting point, this Article discusses why Heller's profoundest
effect may come in seemingly the unlikeliest of areas: not gun control laws, but
copyright restrictions analyzed under the Free Press Clause-which, like the Second
Amendment, not only deals with a technology, but has also remained largely unex-
amined in the Court's First Amendment cases.
II. THE TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Drawing a connection between guns and the printing press, or between the right
to bear arms and the freedom of the press, may seem like a non sequitur, at least to
the modern sensibility. Guns shoot bullets; presses print books. Guns are weapons
that can physically wound, maim, or even kill. Presses are machines that produce
materials that stimulate the mind and spread human knowledge. Today, people do
not typically associate guns and printing presses in the same breath. Historically,
however, the Framing generation did. This Part explains why.
A. The Constitution's Technologies: Guns and Speech Technologies
1. The Text of the First and Second Amendments
In the entire Constitution, only two technologies are specifically recognized for
protection as individual rights-the right to keep and bear "arms" and the freedom
Apr. 2009) (on file with author); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism (Nov. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.con/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1241655.
42 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 252, 255-56 ("[M]any historians reject the Court's
conclusion.").
"3 See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55,65 n.8 (1980); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,264-66 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875).
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of "the press." By "technology," I mean the same definition as it meant in the 1700s:
"a treating of Arts or Workmanship." The "arts" likely referred in this context to
the notion of useful arts or, in other words, practical know-how or technology.45
Thomas Sheridan defined "art" in 1780 as "[t]he power of doing something not taught
by nature and instinct; a science, as the liberal arts; a trade; artfulness, skill, dexterity;
cunning."' In 1777, Samuel Johnson defined "art" in similar fashion.47 The "arts"
were often associated with inventions and innovation. As Daniel Defoe wrote in 1727:
Nor could our relation of the improvement of Arts, and Science,
Navigation, or Plantation, be satisfactory to the curious and en-
quiring Reader, if we did not give an account of those Arts and
Sciences from their beginning, and tell who were the Inventors,
who the Improvers, and who the Patrons of them through all the
Ages of their improvement in the World.48
44 E. COLES, AN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, Collins 1717).
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, (Congress's power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts"); 1 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2007) ("The
general purpose of the statutory classes of subject matter is to limit patent protection to the
field of applied technology, what the United States [C]onstitution calls 'the useful arts."').
By contrast, literature and artistic endeavors were sometimes called the "polite" arts. See W.
KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND MANUFACTURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN, at vi-ix,
32 (London, 1774).
46 THOMAS SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
Wogan 1784); see also TENCH COXE, AN ADDRESS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FRIENDS OF
AMERICAN MANUFACTURES 17-19 (Philadelphia, Aitken & Son 1787) [hereinafter COxE,
AN ADDRESS] (discussing useful arts and manufacturing in England and early America).
47 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Mifflin 4th
ed. 1777). The Patent Act of 1793 defined the scope of patentable subject matter as "any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement [thereof]." Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (emphasis
added). As Karl Lutz explained, "The term 'useful arts,' as used in the Constitution... is
best represented in modem language by the word 'technology."' Karl B. Lutz, Patents and
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 50, 54 (1949).
48 DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF DISCOVERIES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN USEFUL
ARTS, at v (1727); see also id. ("[S]o Invention, useful Undertakings, Arts, Science, all which
were flourishing and encreasing at home under the Carthaginian Government, were likewise
overwhelm'd in it, and all the Manufactures sunk with it.. . ."); Letter from Tench Coxe to
James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), reprinted in 13 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 112 (Charles
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON] ("I
have the satisfaction to inform you that the Artist, who undertook to make the machine for
spinning flax, hemp & wool by water has completed the model & that it is now in my hands
ready for an application for a patent. . .. " (emphasis added)). For an excellent article on Daniel
Defoe's influence in promoting the idea of a written constitution, see Bernadette Meyler,
Daniel Defoe and the Written Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 73 (2008).
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The two "technology" provisions of the Constitution are worth quoting at
length. The Second Amendment states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed."49 The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ."" No other provision anywhere in the
Constitution protects a specific technological device or machine." In this respect,
the Second Amendment and the Free Press Clause are similar and exceptional.
a. Similar: Constitutional Protection for Technologies
First, the similarity. The eighteenth century meaning of "arms" and "press" both
referred to technological devices. As Justice Scalia explained the meaning of "arms"
in Heller:
The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "arms"
as "weapons of offence, or armour of defence." 1 Dictionary of
the English Language 107 (4th ed.). Timothy Cunningham's im-
portant 1771 legal dictionary defined "arms" as "any thing that
a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in
wrath to cast at or strike another." 1 A New and Complete Law
Dictionary (1771); see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of
the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (similar). 2
As I have recounted elsewhere, during the Framing, "the press" meant the printing
press:
Indeed, the freedom of the press historically meant the freedom
of the printing press. In seventeenth and eighteenth century
England, "press" referred to the technology of the printing press
or, more generally, to the publishing of any material by the print-
ing press.... Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English
Language, for example, defined "press" in 1778 as "[tihe instru-
ment by which books are printed." No definition included any
reference to the modem understanding of the press as agents
who report news.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. H (emphasis added).
so Id. amend. I (emphasis added).
" The Patent Clause gives Congress the power to grant patents to "Discoveries" generally
for "limited Times." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. However, this Clause does not require any patents
at all, absent Congress's enactment, and does not specify a certain invention for constitu-
tional recognition.
52 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008).
20091 1047
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
At the time of the Framing, the term "the press" referred to the
printing press. In fact, it was common to refer to the printing
press simply as "the press." Thomas Sheridan's dictionary de-
fined the press in 1780 as "the instrument by which books are
printed"; no definition of "press" included journalists or news
reporters as a collective group or institution.53
I do not argue that the Framers or the Framing generation necessarily thought
of "arms" and the "press" as two related technologies. Nonetheless, I believe it is
significant that they are the only man-made machines or devices specifically protected
in the Bill of Rights, whether or not the Framers ever associated them together.
The principal (initial) drafter of both clauses, James Madison, often spoke of arms
and the press in the same breath. For example, in his notes for his floor speech on
June 8, 1789, in favor of the Bill of Rights, Madison grouped together as features or
flaws of the English Declaration of Rights of 1688: "no freedom of press" as well as
"arms to Protestts" only.' Madison characterized both rights as "private rights. '55
And writing years later, Madison spoke of both rights as vital to the Republic: "'[a]
government resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic,. . . and could not
be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, without a standing army, an
enslaved press, and a disarmed populace. "56
Madison was not alone in drawing a connection between arms and press in the
Framing generation. As Randy Barnett and Don Kates have recounted, "James
Madison, James Monroe, Fisher Ames, Albert Gallatin, and others mentioned the
right to arms in the same breath with freedom of religion and press, and described
them all and interchangeably as 'human rights,' 'private rights,' 'essential and sacred
rights' which 'each individual reserves to himself."' 57
To the modem sensibilities, the historical connection between arms and the press
may seem odd. But, to the Framing generation, the connection would have been
" Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REv. 309, 328-29, 339-40 (2008)
(footnotes omitted); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 123 (photo. reprint 2003) (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829)
('The press is a vehicle of the freedom of speech. The art of printing illuminates the world,
by a rapid dissemination of what would otherwise be slowly communicated and partially
understood .... Wherever a new settlement is formed, and every year presents many such,
a printing press is established as soon as a sufficient number of inhabitants is collected.").
s James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (ca. June 8, 1789), reprinted in 12 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 48, at 193-94.
" Id. (describing "freedom of press-Conscience... arms" as "private rights").
56 RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 640 (1971) (emphasis added).
" Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1176 (1996).
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commonsensical. The right to bear arms and the freedom of the press presented the
exact same type of question for the Framers: can there ever be a natural right to a
man-made device? In the case of arms and presses, the Framers believed so.58
That both technologies were incredibly revolutionary devices developed during
the same era made it logical for commentators to discuss the two together. For ex-
ample, as Defoe wrote in 1725:
As Printing was invented by Koster in 1428, or 1430, Rag Paper
in 1452, so Graving, and Printing by the Rolling Press was brought
on in 1460, and Etching a few Years after in like manner: By the
like degrees Gunpowder was the Invention of the same Century,
and Guns follow'd it close at the Heels; it was impossible that
Powder could be known, and the force of it, and Nature not direct
Men to fight with it.
5 9
Significantly, Defoe described both printing and the making of gunpowder as "arts,"
which in this context undoubtedly meant a form of technology.'
58 Id. at 1172 ("The fact that Madison and his colleagues believed individuals had a natural
right both to freedom of speech and to possess arms for self-defense is crucial evidence that
they meant exactly what they said in guaranteeing 'the right of the people to keep and bear
arms."'); see also FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 52 (London, J. Butterworth
and Son 2d ed. 1816) (discussing freedom of the press and concluding "[tihe same character,
therefore, of natural rights is conveyed to every right which is natural in its origin and principle,
through all the possible modes and instruments of exercising and launching it into action.. .
5 DEFOE, supra note 48, at 226 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 223 ("From hence I must pass to another perfectly new Invention or Improvement,
which the World owes to the same Northern Climate, tho' not the same Country as the other;
namely, the Art of Printing." (emphasis added)); id. at 227 ("Why did not Providence permit
the first Invention of Powder to be so appropriated to one particular Prince or Nation, that they
might have conceal'd the Art of making it... ." (emphasis added)); id. at 229 ("I am told by
some, that the Improvements in the Art of War are such, and so considerable, that no other
Improvements can come up to them; also that these Improvements ought to take a Place in the
Discourse I am upon, and I grant it; but then I think the proper Ephocha to begin our Discourse
upon warlike Improvements, shou'd begin at the Introduction of Guns and Gunpowder...."
(first and third emphasis added)); see also People v. Toynbee, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 329, 347-48
(N.Y. 1855) ("Here are a class of citizens who have invested their property and spent the best
years of their lives in learning and establishing a particular business or trade, inoffensive and
commendable in itself-the growth and manufacture, it may be, of wine, the culture of barley
and hops, the manufacture of firearms and gunpowder, the fabrication of types, printing
presses and paper, and then comes a legislative act, confessing its incompetency to invade or
disturb existing interests, and declares that because wine and the decoction of barley and hops
may lead to intoxication, fire arms and gunpowder to war, bloodshed and the destruction of
human life; and types, printing presses and paper to blasphemous, libelous and obscene pub-
lications, all future acquisitions of the kind shall cease to be regarded as property, and be no
longer entitled to claim the benefit and protection of the laws." (emphasis added)).
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Tench Coxe, a prominent lawyer from Philadelphia who served as a Pennsylvania
delegate to the Confederation Congress, was one of the most vocal advocates for eco-
nomic and technological progress in early America and wrote several important works
on that topic. 6' Coxe, too, described guns and printing both as products of industrial
advancement. 62 Though a Federalist, he, like Madison, eventually supported the rec-
ognition of the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms in the Bill of Rights.
As Coxe wrote in 1789:
The following paragraph declares the freedom of the press to be
a main bulwark of liberty, and reasoning unanswerably from its
usefulness and indispensable necessity, declares, that it shall be
inviolable.
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people, duly before
them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which
shall be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert
their power to the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are
confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their
private arms.63
61 See, e.g., CoxE, AN ADDRESS, supra note 46; TENCH COxE, A VIEW OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Philadelphia 1794) [hereinafter CoxE, A VIEw].
62 COXE, A VIEW, supra note 61, at 39 ("By wind and water machines we can make pig
and bar iron, nail rods, tire, sheet-iron, sheet-copper, sheet-brass, anchors, meal of all kinds,
gun-powder, writing, printing and hanging paper ..." (emphasis added)); id. at 64 ("Paper-
mills, gun-powder-mills, steel works, rolling and slitting mills, printing figured goods of
paper, linen, and even of cotton, coach making, book printing, and several other branches,
are wonderfully advanced: and every month seems to extend our old manufactures, or to
introduce new ones." (emphasis added)).
63 Tench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution,
Moved on the 8th Instant in the House of Representatives, PHILA. FED. GAZETE, June 18,
1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 671 (David E. Young ed., 2d ed.1995) [hereinafter THE ORIGIN OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT]. For more of Coxe's writings on the Bill of Rights, see Tench
Coxe, Remarks on the Second Part of the Amendments, Moved on the 8th Instant in the
House of Representatives, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, June 30, 1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra, at 674-75 ("The fifth proposition is an admirable thought.
The Congress of the United States not only declare that liberty of conscience-the freedom
of the press-and trial by jury are due from them to the people of this Union, but deeming
them as precious as the Republican form of our government, they declare, that no State under
pretence of a separate jurisdiction, shall violate either of them."); Letter from Tench Coxe
to James Madison (June 18, 1789), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT,
supra, at 672 ('Those who are honest are well pleased at the footing on which the press, liberty
of conscience, original right & power, trial by jury &ca. are rested .... I... feel very great
satisfaction in being able to assure you generally, that the proposed amendments will greatly
tend to promote harmony among the late contending parties and a general confidence in the
patriotism of Congress.").
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It is also significant that five of the eight states that proposed amendments during
the ratification of the Constitution offered proposals for protecting the freedom of
the press (Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia),64 while
five states also proposed the right to bear arms (New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia). 65 And of these states, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
North Carolina, three very influential states, placed the proposals for the freedom
of the press and the right to bear arms consecutively or back-to-back66-which is
how eventually they came to be ordered in the Bill of Rights in what became the
First and Second Amendments. In their state constitutions and declarations of rights,
Massachusetts (1780), Pennsylvania (1776), and Vermont (1777) also listed the pro-
tections for the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms consecutively.67
To the Framing generation, the right to bear arms was important to self-defense
and the ability to defend against the tyranny of the state.68 Likewise, the right to the
freedom of the press was important to self-expression, as well as to defend against the
tyranny of the state. As the Continental Congress explained the importance of the
freedom of the press in 1774:
The importance of this [freedom of the press] consists, besides
the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government, its ready communication of thoughts between sub-
jects, and its consequential promotion of union among them,
whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.69
Likewise, as the Federal Farmer championed the right to bear arms in 1788: "To pre-
serve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms,
and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them."7° While the right to
64 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983 (1971)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THEBILLOFRIGHT]; id. at 658 (Pennsylvania); id. at 734 (Maryland);
id. at 842 (Virginia); id. at 913 (New York); id. at 968 (North Carolina).
65 Id. at 658 (Pennsylvania); id. at 761 (New Hampshire); id. at 842 (Virginia); id. at 912
(New York); id. at 968 (North Carolina).
66 Id. at 658 (Pennsylvania); id. at 842 (Virginia); id. at 968 (North Carolina).
67 1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 266 (Pennsylvania); id. at 324
(Vermont); id. at 342 (Massachusetts). Ten of the twelve original states recognized the freedom
of the press in their constitutions, while eight also recognized some of the same concerns that
later were addressed in the Second Amendment in a variety of different clauses. See L.A.
Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1311,
1350 (1997).
6' See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2800-01 (2008).
69 HENRY MIDDLETON, ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF QUEBEC (1774), reprinted in
1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 223.
70 LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBUCAN 124 (Walter Hartwell
Bennett ed., 1978).
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bear arms was important for self-defense and the freedom of the press for self-
expression, both were considered fundamental to liberty and were each described
separately in the Framing era as the "palladium of liberty."'" The disarming of the
populace and the destruction of printing presses were anathemas to a free state-as
the Second Amendment ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State... ,)7 2 and Blackstone in his influential Commentaries ("The liberty
of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state .... ,)7 3 both recognized.
In 1799, this connection between arms and presses, and the whole concept of
liberty and a free state, was made clear during the turmoil between the Federalists
and Republicans (i.e., Anti-Federalists). As Stephen Halbrook and David Kopel
have recounted:
By mid-1799... armed conflict between Federalists and Repub-
licans threatened. The Aurora published reports of bullying,
weapons brandishing, and rioting by soldiers in the Federalist
faction. In retaliation, a mob of "federal savages" attacked and
beat Aurora editor William Duane. As a consequence of the
mob's threat to destroy the press, "a number of Republican citi-
zens collected with arms and ammunition, continue to mount
guard in the Printing-Office. 74
As this incident shows, the citizens in this conflict would have been unable to protect
their printing press from destruction without the right to bear arms.
In short, both rights protect individual liberty,75 and guard against tyrannical
governments.76 As Professor Sanford Levinson has explained:
71 See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 300 (Philadelphia, William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) ("[The Second Amendment] may be considered as the
true palladium of liberty."); see also XIII THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION: 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 479
(1981) ("The press is the scourge of tyrants and the grandpalladium of liberty."). For more
on St. George Tucker's broad understanding of the freedom of the press and the right to bear
arms, see Powe, supra note 67, at 1369-70.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
71 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *15 1.
4 Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms,1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 347, 371 (1999).
7' At the time of the Framing, it was far more common for households to own guns than
printing presses. During the Framing generation, gun ownership for protection and hunting
purposes was common. See Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and
Public: Safety in Early America, 44 WILLAMErE L. REV. 699, 710-11 (2008). By compar-
ison, the printing press was not a household device, but instead a machine for those engaged
in publishing---estimated to be 200 in number in 1798. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing
Copyright's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 37, 45 (2002).
76 See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARv.
L. REV. 963, 1013 n. 157 (1998) ('These implications should be especially important for anyone
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Scholars of the First Amendment have made us aware of the
importance of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, whose Cato's
Letter's were central to the formation of the American notion of
freedom of the press. That notion includes what Vincent Blasi
would come to call the "checking value" of a free press, which
stands as a sturdy exposer of governmental misdeeds. Consider
the possibility, though, that the ultimate "checking value" in a
Republican polity is the ability of an armed populace, presump-
tively motivated by a shared commitment to the common good,
to resist governmental tyranny. Indeed, one of Cato's letters
refers to "the Exercise of despotick Power [as] the unrelenting
",7War of an armed Tyrant upon his unarmed Subjects....
One need look no further than the American Revolution itself to understand the neces-
sity of the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms as safeguards of liberty, and
as weapons of the right of revolution against a tyrannical state."8
b. Exceptional: Only Two "Technology" Provisions in Bill of Rights
Now let us turn to the exceptional quality shared by the freedom of the press and
the right to bear arms. The Framers singled out, by name, only two technologies for
express protection in the Bill of Rights-"arms" and "press"-in amendments that
follow each other.79 I believe it is worth dwelling on this basic textual similarity
shared by the two clauses. It is one so easy to overlook. As a textual matter, the con-
nection between the two technologies is suggestive (and, as I later show, the history
of the Framing is confirmatory).
The constitutional method I rely on is what Professor Akhil Amar has champi-
oned as intratextualism-i.e., "[i]n deploying this technique, the interpreter tries to
who emphasizes the 'checking value' that underlies the free speech and press provisions of
the First Amendment, for there can be little doubt that many members of the founding gener-
ation viewed popular possession of arms as the ultimate 'check' on corrupt governments.").
But see Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem offHistory in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 221,229-30 (1999) ("While this comparison is instructive, it rests on an historically
questionable reading of the way the press functioned in post-revolutionary America. While
leading Pennsylvania Constitutionalists certainly believed in freedom of the press, these same
individuals also accepted the notion of seditious libel.").
71 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing SecondAmendment, 99 YALEL.J. 637,648 (1989).
78 See Powe, supra note 67, at 1365 ("Words and guns enabled a successful revolution, and
it is not surprising that the founding generation thought highly of both. William Cushing, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote in a letter to John Adams: 'With-
out this liberty of the press could we have supported our liberties against british administration?
or could our revolution have taken place? Pretty certainly it could not."').
'9 U.S. CONST. amends. I & H.
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read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another
passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase. 80
More generally, my proposed method of constitutional interpretation of the Free
Press Clause follows what Professor Laurence Tribe has described as "[tireating the
text in a holistic way."'" My basic insight is this: given that they both protect tech-
nologies, and are the only two clauses in the Constitution that do so expressly, the
Free Press Clause and the Second Amendment can provide insights to understanding
each respective clause.
This interpretive principle is similar to the in pari materia canon of construction.
In the statutory context, courts entertain this canon, under which "statutes addressing
the same subject matter generally should be read 'as if they were one law.'" 2 In the
case of the Constitution, I am suggesting something similar, albeit perhaps weaker,
than the in pari materia canon: provisions addressing the same subject matter gen-
erally (or same genus) may be worth consulting holistically to interpret one or the
other provision, at least as a form of persuasive authority.
A clear example of this dynamic is provided by criminal law protections. For
example, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination (i.e., against being
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself') 83 and the Sixth
Amendment right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence"' are not similar
looking in language. Yet they both fall within the larger genus of protections for
criminal defendants, including, specifically, the protections during police interro-
gation. Thus, as protections related to police interrogations, the two amendments
each may offer helpful precedents for interpreting the other. In Michigan v. Jackson,
the Supreme Court drew upon its prior interpretation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination (that requires custodial interrogation to cease after a defen-
dant has asked for counsel) in Edwards v. Arizona and applied nearly the same inter-
pretation of the right to counsel during interrogation under the Sixth Amendment
after a defendant has been arraigned.85 Likewise, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the due process test of prejudice for a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence under Brady under the same standard for judging prejudice under the Sixth
80 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
81 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INvIsIBLE CONSTITUTION 74 (2008); see also Balkin &
Levinson, supra note 76, at 1013 (arguing for holistic examination of Bill of Rights and
recognition that "the component parts of the Bill of Rights are interrelated").
82 Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 305 (2006) (quoting
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972)).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id. amend. VI.
85 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (discussing Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477,482 (1981)). In 2009, the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing in
a case, asking whether Michigan v. Jackson should be overruled. See Montejo v. Louisiana,
No. 07-1529, 2009 WL 793514, at *1 (U.S. March 27,2009).
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Amendment protection against ineffective assistance of counsel.8 6 In these examples,
the text of the constitutional provisions is not similar in language, yet they encompass
things that fall within a larger genus--e.g., the right to counsel during interrogation
and prejudice that arises from an impropriety in a criminal prosecution.
The Copyright and Patent Clauses provide another clear example of constitu-
tional provisions addressing the same general subject matter that the Court some-
times interprets in similar fashion. First, there can be no doubt that the two clauses
address the same general subject matter of "exclusive right," given the way the two
clauses are written and interlaced together: Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies. ' Although the Court has recognized that copyrights and patents sometimes
raise different concerns, it has often drawn upon copyright or patent cases for its
analysis of the other.88
Granted, the criminal law protections in the Bill of Rights and the Patent and
Copyright Clauses are much easier to identify for possible holistic interpretation.
The thread tying them together is tight and obvious---criminal investigation and prose-
cutions, and the grant of "exclusive right," respectively. In the case of "arms" and
"press," however, the connection, if any, is far from clear. The inclusion of both
"arms" and "press" could be pure coincidence. There is no single event (like a crim-
inal trial) or term ("exclusive right") that necessarily connects the two.
Yet it is important to recognize the need for exploring the possibility of a con-
nection here, instead of dismissing it out of hand. Silence sometimes is striking. The
Constitution does not mention the wheel, abacus, watch, telescope, or microscope for
protection, notwithstanding their revolutionary advancements before the Framing.
Instead, the Constitution only specifies "arms" and "press." That's it.
The singularity of these two technologies in the Bill of Rights, coupled with the
common references to both technologies by Madison, Coxe, Defoe, and others in the
same passages, warrants further examination. Had the Bill of Rights recognized
instead a "freedom of the microscope" and the "right of the people to keep and use
telescopes" in two consecutive amendments, it would be hard to deny the need for
investigating a possible connection between the two. The "freedom of the press"
and "right to bear and keep arms" should merit the same. Employing a method of
86 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995) (stating that for a Brady violation, "[a]
'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's
evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial'); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ("When a defendant challenges a conviction, the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.").
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
88 See Lee, supra note 53, at 394 & n.486.
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intratextualism, 89 and examining the Constitution holistically, should give us at least
pause at the inclusion of two words in the Constitution that appear to fall within the
same genus (technology)-which is rarely mentioned in the Constitution. The fol-
lowing sections identify other textual and historical connections between the right to
bear arms and the freedom of the press that provide an even stronger reason for the
Court to consult its Heller decision in interpreting the Free Press Clause.
2. Textual Similarities Between the Freedom of the Press and the Right to Bear
Arms in State Constitutions and Earlier Drafts of the Bill of Rights
Another textual similarity between the freedom of the press and the right to bear
arms can be found in several state constitutions. As Eugene Volokh has noted in an
insightful essay, the provisions recognizing the freedom of the press in the state con-
stitutions of Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), Rhode Island (1842),
North Carolina (1776), and Pennsylvania (1776) all had a "justification" or "prefatory"
clause, a feature that distinguishes the Second Amendment from all other provisions
in the Bill of Rights.9° Thus, the unique verbiage and structure of the Second Amend-
ment with a prefatory clause in the Constitution was, in fact, emulated in free press
clauses containing prefatory clauses in state constitutions.
For example, the Massachusetts Constitution stated in 1780, in language strik-
ingly similar to the Second Amendment's prefatory clause, "The liberty of the press
is essential to the security offreedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained
in this Commonwealth."91 Likewise, Rhode Island's free press clause stated in 1842,
"The liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any
person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty .... ,92 The Second Amendment contains remarkably similar language in its
prefatory or justification clause about the necessity of a well-regulated militia "to the
security of a free State."93
" Admittedly, I may be expanding intratextualism beyond Amar's own brand of intra-
textualism. The words "anus" and "press" are not the same or similar looking, in contrast
with the several uses of "inferior," "the people," or other terms in the Constitution. See Amar,
supra note 80. Instead, they are similar in that they fall within a larger genus, class of thing,
or subject matter-here, a technology or art. However, Amar does recognize the kind of
holistic textualism I am relying on as a legitimate approach that is consistent with his theory.
Id. at 796 ('The particular type of intratextualism that I am highlighting here harmonizes nicely
with other forms of holistic textualism. Even if adjoining clauses have no linguistic overlap,
they often deal with related subjects, and each is often illuminated by careful comparison with
its neighbors.").
9o Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793,794-95,
814 (1998).
9' MASS. CONST. art. XVI (1780), superceded by MASS. CONST. art. LXXVII, reprinted
in 1 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 342 (emphasis added).
92 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
9' U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Although the Free Press Clause in the Bill of Rights does not contain any jus-
tification or prefatory clause, Virginia's proposal94 and James Madison's original
proposal for the Free Press Clause95 both did. My conjecture is that the justification
clause for the Free Press Clause became expendable or unwieldy during the drafting
process as the First Congress joined several different rights-i.e., the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses, the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, the Assembly and
Petition Clauses-in one amendment.96
The importance of the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms was apparent
in the ratification debates. For example, during the ratification of the Constitution
in Massachusetts, Samuel Adams proposed amending the Constitution:
And that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize
Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of
conscience; or to prevent the people of the United States, who
are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms; or to raise
standing armies, unless when necessary for the defence of the
United States, or of some one or more of them; or to prevent the
people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the
federal legislature, for a redress of grievances; or to subject the
people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons,
papers or possessions.9 7
Significantly, Adams placed the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms con-
secutively and at the opening of his proposal. Although Adams eventually withdrew
his proposal, a letter to the editor in Philadelphia argued that Adams had been vindi-
cated by Congress's consideration of "every one of [Adams's] intended alterations,
but one ... "98 Notably, an early draft of the Bill of Rights in the House (dated
Aug. 24, 1789) used similar language in recognizing the freedom of the press and
the right to bear arms both as rights that "shall not be infringed."" These several
94 2 SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 842 ("That the people have a right
to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the
press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.").
9' Id. at 1026 ("The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to
write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks
of liberty, shall be inviolable.").
96 For a detailed recounting of the various versions and proposals for what later became
the First Amendment, see Lee, supra note 53, at 347-48.
9' Excerpts of Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OFTHE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 63, at 260 (emphasis added).
98 Letter to the Editors, PHiLA. INDEP. GAZETEER, Aug. 20, 1789, reprinted in THEORIGINS
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 63, at 701-02.
99 See Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Aug. 24, 1759, reprinted in THE
ORIGINS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 63, at 706-07.
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examples demonstrate that the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms were
concepts set forth in very similar language in state constitutions and early drafts of
the Bill of Rights.
B. Comparing the Historical Development of the Right to Bear Arms and the
Freedom of the Press
Even beyond the textual connection between "arms" and "press" in the Consti-
tution, there is a striking similarity in the historical development of the right to bear
arms and the freedom of the press. Arms and presses both were subject to severe
governmental restrictions in seventeenth-century England until a backlash against
the restrictions led to their demise.1" That history in England informed the Framers,
the ratifying states of the U.S. Constitution, and the First Congress, sparking very
similar debates on the need for their express protection in the Constitution during
the ratification.
1. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms
As Justice Scalia explained in much greater detail in Heller,'01 the historical
development of the concept of a right to bear arms dates back to seventeenth-century
England in reaction to the Crown's abuses."°2 Specifically, "the Stuart Kings Charles I
and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political dis-
sidents, in part by disarming their opponents."' 3 For example, the Militia Act of 1662
gave royally appointed militia officers the power "to search for and seize all arms"
of anyone they judged "dangerous to the peace of the kingdom."'' 4
In reaction, Protestants were able to convince William and Mary to recognize a
provision in the Declaration of Right (1689) to protect Protestants from disarmament:
"That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to
their conditions and as allowed by law.""1 5 This provision was a precursor to the
more general notion of the right to bear arms. In his Commentaries, Blackstone
" See Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her
Majesty's Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1232-35 (1982) (noting that with
the enactment of the 1689 Bill of Rights, "English liberty was assured protection from illegal
action by the Crown," and that the Bill of Rights ensured that "English rights and freedoms"
would then be enforced).
01 I do not attempt to critique the accuracy of the historical accounts of the Second Amend-
ment by the majority or the dissent. Instead, I take the majority's narrative as a "given," so to
speak, because it is the historical account that figured into the Court's ultimate decision.
"0 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008).
103 Id.
104 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 14.
105 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 7).
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described this provision in the Declaration of Right as protecting "the natural right
of resistance and self-preservation" and "the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence."'"
This same saga would play out in the American colonies during the 1760s and
1770s, when George III attempted to disarm the colonists, which sparked protest
among them against the Crown.' 7 Against this backdrop, the debate over the Second
Amendment was framed. As Justice Scalia recounted:
The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with
other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it
was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed
to be codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification
debates, the fear that the federal government would disarm the
people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select
militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e.g., Letters
from The Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981). John Smilie, for
example, worried not only that Congress's "command of the
militia" could be used to create a "select militia," or to have "no
militia at all," but also, as a separate concern, that "when a select
militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed." 2
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution
508-509 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). Federalists responded that be-
cause Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient right
of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never
oppress the people. See, e.g., A Pennsylvanian Ell (Feb. 20,
1788), in The Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D.
Young ed., 2d ed. 2001); White, To the Citizens of Virginia,
Feb. 22, 1788, in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen of America, (Oct. 10,
1787) in id., at 38, 40; Remarks on the Amendments to the federal
Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in id., at 556.108
In the end, the Anti-Federalist argument carried the day, and the right to keep and
bear arms was expressly codified in the Second Amendment.
2. The Freedom of the Press
The history of the freedom of the press followed a remarkably similar course.
In prior scholarship, I have recounted, at length, the history of the freedom of the
106 Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 CoMMENTARIES *139-40).
107 Id. at 2799.
'08 Id. at 2801.
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press from England to the early United States, so I will only summarize the main
highlights here. 109
Just as with the right to bear arms, the historical development of the concept of
the freedom of the press dates back to the abuses of the Crown in restricting the
technology in order to suppress political and religious dissent."' The press restric-
tions began in 1538 under Henry VIII and continued until the early 1700s, including
through the Stuart reign."'
A major part of the repressive regime in England were the Printing Acts,"' which,
not only required prepublication licensing of every work,' 13 but also restricted and
even attempted to reduce the total number of presses in England. 14 The Printing
Acts helped to entrench the Stationers' Company, a guild of printers and publishers
who effectively held a monopoly over the presses as well as the copyrights to nearly
all works." 5 No work could be published without registration in the Stationers'
Company; all printing presses had to be registered with the Company as well." 6
"O Lee, supra note 53, at 319-56.
"0 Id. at 320-23.
"1 Id.
112 Printing Acts were enacted in 1643, 1647, 1649, 1653, 1662, 1664, 1665, 1685, and
1692. See An Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing, 1643 [hereinafter Printing Act of
1643], reprinted in 1 ACTS AND ORDINANCES INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 184 (C.H. Firth
& R.S. Rait eds., 1978) (1911) [hereinafter ACTS AND ORDINANCES]; An Ordinance against
unlicensed or scandalous Pamphlets, and and for the better Regulating of Printing, 1647,
reprinted in 1 ACTS AND ORDINANCES, supra, at 1021; An Act against Unlicensed and
Scandalous Books and Pamphlets, and for better regulating of Printing, 1649, reprinted in
2 ACTS AND ORDINANCES, supra, at 245; An Act for reviving of a former Act, Entituled, An
Act against Unlicensed and Scandalous Books and Pamphlets, andfor Regulating of Printing,
with some Additions and explanations, 1653, reprinted in 2 ACTs AND ORDINANCES, supra,
at 696; An act for preventing abuses in printing seditious, treasonable, and unlicensed books
and pamphlets, and for regulating of printing and printing-presses, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.
33 [hereinafter Printing Act of 1662]; An act for continuance of a former act for regulating
the press, 1664, 16 & 17 Car. 2, c. 7; An act for continuance of a former act for regulating the
press, 1664, 17 Car. 2, c. 4; An act for reviving and continuance of several acts of parliament
therein mentioned, 1685, 1 Jac. 2, c. 17; An act for reviving, continuing, and explaining sev-
eral laws therein mentioned, which are expired and near expiring, 1692, 4 W. & M., c. 24.
The predecessor regime under the Star Chamber decrees, which ended in 1640, were
equally as oppressive and provided the basic blueprint for the Printing Acts. See Star Chamber
Decree of 1566, reprinted in 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF
STATIONERS OF LONDON, 1554-1640, at 145b (Edward Arber ed., 1875) [hereinafter
STATIONERS OF LONDON]; Star Chamber Decree of 1586, reprinted in 2 STATIONERS OF
LONDON, supra, at 807; Star Chamber Decree of 1637, reprinted in 4 STATIONERS OF
LONDON, supra, at 529.
"' For more on the prepublication licensing requirement, see JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY
OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 36-37 (2d. ed. 2006).
"" Lee, supra note 53, 321-22.
15 Id. at 320-22.
116 Id. at 321.
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Backed by a royal charter"17 and the Printing Acts, the Stationers had the power to
conduct warrantless searches and confiscate illegal presses,"' in a way similar to
how the royally backed militia officers could seize arms under the Militia Act of
1662.
For example, the Printing Act of 1643 stated:
[T]he Master and Wardens of the said Company... are hereby
Authorized and required, from time to time, to make diligent
search in all places, where they shall think meet, for all unlicensed
Printing Presses, and all Presses any way imployed in the printing
of scandalous or unlicensed Papers, Pamphlets, Books, or any
Copies of Books belonging to the said Company, or any member
thereof, without their approbation and consents, and to seize and
cary away such Printing Presses Letters, together with the Nut,
Spindle, and other materials of every such irregular Printer, which
they find so misimployed, unto the Common Hall of the said
Company there to be defaced and made unserviceable according
to ancient Custom .... 119
Thus, one of the key components of the Printings Acts was their attempt to
control the perceived "licentiousness" of the press, including copyright infringement
and unauthorized printings in England, by limiting the technology itself. As the
Printing Act of 1662 expressly stated, there was "no surer means" of controlling
licentiousness than "by reducing and limiting the number of printing-presses, and
by ordering and settling the said art or mystery of printing by act of parliament, in
manner as herein after is expressed."' 20
To that end, the Printing Acts imposed a strict regime of technology restrictions
in England. Indeed, the Printing Act of 1662 sought to reduce the total number of
printing presses allowed in England to just forty. 21 By restricting the technology,
... Philip and Mary granted the Stationers' Company its first royal charter in 1557, which
Elizabeth I expanded in 1586. Id. at 320-21. The royal charter gave the company the sweep-
ing power to search houses and businesses of all printers and book sellers for unauthorized
materials and presses. Id. at 321-22; see also I STATIONERS OF LONDON, supra note 112, at
xxviii-xxxii (reprinting Royal Charter of 1557).
1l8 Lee, supra note 53, at 322; see Star Chamber Decree for Orders in Printing, 1586, 28
Eliz., §§ 6-7; see also 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:6 (2007) ("The
Company was granted the power to search printing and bookselling establishments, to seize
illegally printed books, and to imprison violators."); Raymond Astbury, The Renewal of the
Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in 1695, 33 LIBRARY 296, 296 (1978).
1 Printing Act of 1643, reprinted in 1 AcTs AND ORDINANCES, supra note 112, at 185.
120 Printing Act of 1662, supra note 112 (emphasis added).
.2 Id. §§ 11-12. The Act hoped to achieve this reduction in number of presses by the even-
tual deaths of the then-living printers that could own presses, leaving only twenty printers in
England who each could own only two presses. Id.
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the Act attempted to stop copyright infringement and other unauthorized publica-
tions. The rationale was as simple as it was pernicious: without the technology, the
general public could not use the press to make unauthorized printings-or any
printings at all. 1
22
Just as with the Crown's efforts to disarm the populace of guns, the Crown's
efforts to limit and even destroy printing presses sparked an intense backlash among
the people. 23 The protest galvanized around the concept of "the freedom of the
press," which eventually helped to secure the demise of the Printing Acts."24 In its
place, Parliament later passed the Statute of Anne in 1710, the first copyright act in
England.' 5z Besides limiting the terms of copyrights for authors, the Statute of Anne
is significant for what it did not do: it "did not attempt to limit the number of print-
ing presses or printers, or otherwise regulate the presses as was the case under the
Printing Acts."'
126
Thus, a crucial part of the freedom of the press in England was the shift from the
regime of press controls under the Printing Acts, along with the Stationers' Company's
physical control over the presses themselves, 127 to the less restrictive alternative of
a copyright system that had no power to limit the technology of the printing presses
whatsoever. 2 Even though one of the express purposes of the Statute of Anne was
to combat piracy or copyright infringement, the Act did not replicate the press restric-
tions of the past. 29 In short, there were no more technology limits. The printing
presses became free.
122 The Crown sought control over the printing presses primarily for censorship reasons,
e.g., to stop perceived seditious or heretical writings, whereas the Stationers' Company exer-
cised its power over the presses in order to stop the "piracy" of its works. Over time, as the
Crown diminished in power, the anti-piracy rationale predominated over the censorship ratio-
nale in the restrictions on the printing press. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress
and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 365, 395-99 (2004).
123 Lee, supra note 53, at 323-25.
124 Id. at 325-26.
125 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Author's or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1710,
8 Ann., c. 19 [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
126 Lee, supra note 53, at 327.
'" John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition ofAuthors'Rights
in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 10 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 455,463 (1992) ("For more than a century after the invention of printing, it was
the printers, with their command of the limited technical facilities for book production, who
controlled the trade .... [Ilt was the printers who dominated the Stationers' Company in the
first ten or fifteen years after its Charter was granted."). The only other individuals outside
of the Stationers' Company who could own presses in England were those who had obtained
printing patents, under the royal prerogative, directly from the Crown. See id. at 456; see also
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OwNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 12 (1993).
'28 Lee, supra note 53, at 327-30.
129 Statute of Anne, supra note 125, at preamble (recognizing that "printers, booksellers, and
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In his Commentaries, Blackstone recognized the monumental significance of
the demise of the Printing Acts, which, as he described, had "limited the number of
printers, and of presses each should employ, and prohibited new publications unless
previously approved by proper licensers."'' 30 Once these restrictions on the press were
removed, "'the press became properly free... and has ever since so continued."",4
3
'
St. George Tucker, writing annotations to Blackstone in the early United States, made
similar observations on the historical connection between the end of the several re-
strictions of the Printing Acts and the beginning of the freedom of the press.
1 32
The English history of press restrictions informed the Framing of the Free Press
Clause, and the debate between Anti-Federalists and the Federalists. 133 The debate
over the necessity (or not) of a free press clause followed a very similar terrain as the
debate over the right to bear arms, with the Federalists arguing that a free press clause
was unnecessary because Congress had no express power to regulate the press."3
That stock argument did not persuade the Anti-Federalists, who pointed specifically
to the Copyright Clause as a possible basis for Congress to restrict the press. 35 For
example, Robert Whitehall of Pennsylvania argued:
Tho[ugh] it is not declared that Congress have a power to destroy
the liberty of the press; yet, in effect, they will have it.... They
have a power to secure to authors the right of their writings.
Under this, they may license the press, no doubt; and under licens-
ing the press, they may suppress it.13
6
The proposal for a free press clause was thus defended as necessary to limit Congress's
ability to use copyright under the Copyright Clause in a way to restrict the printing
press. 3 1 In response, the Federalists argued that the Copyright Clause only gave
other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing...
book and other writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and
writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families").
13' Lee, supra note 53, at 329 (quoting WILIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152).
Blackstone's view was shared by J.L. de Lolme, in THE CONSTrruTION OF ENGLAND 288 (T.
Spilsbury ed., 1775) (noting that after the "prohibitions" of the Printing Acts were rejected
in 1694, "the freedom of the press. . . was finally established").
"' Lee, supra note 53, at 329 (quoting WIIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152);
see, e.g., Star Chamber Decree for Orders in Printing, 1586, 28 Eliz., §§ 1-3; Printing Act
of 1662, supra note 112, §§ 11-12.
132 1 TUCKER, supra note 71, at app. 12.
133 Lee, supra note 53, at 331-39.
'34 Id. at 332-33.
131 Id. at 334.
136 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATI-
FICATION OF THE CONSTrrTiON BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 454 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976) (first emphasis added).
137 Id.
2009] 1063
WILLIAM & MARY BLL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Congress the limited power to secure copyrights to authors for limited times similar
to the Statute of Anne in England. As James Iredell (who would later serve as a jus-
tice on the first Supreme Court) explained:
The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for declamation,
but the future Congress will have no other authority over this
than to secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege
of publishing their works. This authority has been long exercised
in England, where the press is as free as among ourselves or in
any country in the world; and surely such an encouragement to
genius is no restraint on the liberty of the press, since men are
allowed to publish what they please of their own, and so far as this
may be deemed a restraint upon others it is certainly a reasonable
one, and can be attended with no danger of copies not being suf-
ficiently multiplied, because the interest of the proprietor will
always induce him to publish a quantity fully equal to the demand.
Besides, that such encouragement may give birth to many excel-
lent writings which would otherwise have never appeared. If the
Congress should exercise any other power over the press than
this, they will do it without any warrant from this constitution,
and must answer for it as any other act of tyranny. 138
But Iredell's argument failed to mollify the Anti-Federalists, who were successful
in securing the Free Press Clause in the Bill of Rights.
Legal scholars have long overlooked this connection between the Free Press
Clause and the Copyright Clause. Professors Patterson and Joyce are right to suggest
that the Free Press Clause was "the companion-piece of the Copyright Clause.' 39
Indeed, the Free Press Clause was more than just a companion-it was the chaperone
for the Copyright Clause, establishing limits on what the Copyright Clause can do.
The Free Press Clause forbids Congress from resurrecting technology restrictions
of the kind imposed under the Printing Acts in England. "°
38 JAMES IREDELL, OBSERVATIONS ON GEORGE MASON'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE FEDERAL
CONSTrrUTION (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
360-61 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (emphasis added).
3 L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders'
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 946 (2003).
"4 In this respect, the Free Press Clause may be slightly different from the design of the
Second Amendment. Unlike the Second Amendment, the Free Press Clause must be read in
direct relation to and as a direct limit on another clause of the Constitution, namely, the
Copyright Clause, in order to understand one of the Free Press Clause's core protections. One
could argue that the Second Amendment also must be read in direct relation to the Militia
Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 & 16; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178
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C. The Heller Court's Analogies Between the Second Amendment and the Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses
Lest there be any lingering doubt about the connection between the Second
Amendment and the Free Press Clause, the Heller decision itself provides numerous
analogies to both the Free Press Clause and the First Amendment. Indeed, on no less
than six occasions in discussing the Second Amendment, the Heller Court drew a
direct analogy to the First Amendment, including several times specifically to the
Free Press Clause.''
For example, in explaining why examining the history of the right to bear arms in
England was necessary, the Heller Court stated that "it has always been widely under-
stood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a
pre-existing right.' ' 142 And, in further describing the scope of the Second Amendment,
the Court again pointed to the First Amendment for several direct analogies, all indi-
cating similarities rather than differences between the two provisions:
Just as the First Amendment protects modem forms of communi-
cations ... the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
not in existence at the time of the founding. 1
43
(1939). The Heller Court, however, did not view the connection to be as direct as the dissent
did. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799-2801 (2008) (majority
opinion), with id. at 2831-32 (dissenting opinion). The slight difference from the design of
the Second Amendment does not vitiate the argument for interpreting the Free Press Clause
in a similar manner to the Court's analysis of the Second Amendment. Both clauses have an
original, core protection dating back to the Framers that should be recognized and enforced.
Another complexity that the Second Amendment does not possess is that the Free Press
Clause also is a companion to the Free Speech Clause. Although the Court has on a few occa-
sions considered the intersection between the Copyright Clause and the Free Speech Clause
or First Amendment more generally, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("The
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates
that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech
principles."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("[Tlhe Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing
a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive
to create and disseminate ideas."), the Court has yet to discuss or analyze the relationship be-
tween the Free Press and the Copyright Clauses, or the precise relationship between the Free
Press and the Free Speech Clauses. The Free Press Clause protects a separate, but related right
to the Free Speech Clause-while the latter protects expression itself, the former protects
speech technologies from governmental restrictions, especially those imposed through copy-
right law. For a more complete exegesis of the relationship between the Free Press and the
Free Speech Clauses, see Lee, supra note 53, at 339-51.
141 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791, 2797, 2799.
142 Id. at 2797.
141 Id. at 2791-92.
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The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee
that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity,
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of
extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second
Amendment is no different. 44
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the
First Amendment's right of free speech was not.... Thus, we do
not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to
carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read
the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for
any purpose. 1
45
If those passages were not enough, the Heller Court also quotes approvingly from
an 1825 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion and an 1868 constitutional
law treatise that make the direct analogy between the right to bear arms and the free-
dom of the printing press:
The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used
it was to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep
fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoy-
ance or destruction.'"
The [Second Amendment] clause is analogous to the one securing
the freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom, not license, is
secured; the fair use, not the libellous abuse, is protected. 47
'44 Id. at 2821.
I d. at 2799 (internal citations omitted).
'" Id. at 2803 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313-14
(1825)).
141 Id. at 2812 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 152-53 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1868)).
Comparing the right to bear arms and the freedom of the press apparently was not uncommon
in the early 1800s. See, e.g., H.P. NUGENT, AN AccouNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, AGAINST THIERRY & NUGENT FOR LIBELS
AND CONTEMPT OF COURT 43 (Phila. 1810) ("It is true, said [Judge Francois Xavier Martin],
the constitution secures the liberty of the press, but it likewise secures the liberty of keeping
arms; now, as the liberty of keeping arms is not the liberty of killing or maiming whom we
please, so is not the liberty of the press, the liberty of publishing libels."); REPORT OF THE
TRIAL, TIMOTHY UPHAM vs. HLL & BARTON FOR AN ALLEGED LIBEL, AT THE COURT OF
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These passages from the 1800s, along with the Court's own analysis, suggest that
the Court might apply the same or similar kind of interpretive method to determine
the meaning of the Free Press Clause. The next Part explains why the Court should.
III. Is HELLER RELEVANT TO INTERPRETING THE FREE PRESS CLAUSE?
The Heller Court's several analogies between the First and Second Amendments
notwithstanding, most legal commentators have not ever entertained a possible con-
nection between the two amendments. The notable exception is L.A. Powe, whose
provocative article in 1999 compared the two and suggested that First Amendment
case law may be helpful in thinking about the Second Amendment. 48 While sug-
gestive, even Powe' s article overlooked the historical connection between arms and
presses at the time of the Framing. Although Powe's article has elicited very little re-
sponse in legal scholarship over the years, Heller confirmed Powe' s insight by making
several analogies to the First Amendment. 49 Not surprisingly, First Amendment
COMMON PLEAS, ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 74 (Concord, Hill & Barton 1831) ("What is liberty
of person?-liberty of speech? Are we not free? But have we a right to knock down and
trample upon all whom we may dislike?... We have, too, the right of bearing arms. And if
we are not permitted to throw a brand into our neighbor's dwelling, or discharge our rifle upon
the passers by in the street, we could as well complain of being enslaved, as to say the press
is shackled, because it may not, by falsehood, assault the character of any and every citizen,
when and where its conductors may choose.") (argument of lawyer Ichabod Bartlett). Thanks
to Eugene Volokh for these examples.
148 See Powe, supra note 67, at 1313; cf. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment
and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1240 (1994) ("The main reason there
is such a vacuum of useful Second Amendment understanding, rather, is the arrested juris-
prudence of the subject as such, a condition due substantially to the Supreme Court's own
inertia-the same inertia that similarly afflicted the First Amendment virtually until the third
decade of this twentieth century when Holmes and Brandeis finally were moved personally
to take the First Amendment seriously (as previously it scarcely ever was).").
14' The only extended discussion of Powe's idea appears to have come in a student note
in 2003. See David G. Browne, Note, Treating the Pen and the Sword as Constitutional Equals:
How and Why the Supreme Court Should Apply Its First Amendment Expertise to the Great
Second Amendment Debate, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2287 (2003); see also Calvin Massey,
Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1128 (2000) (analo-
gizing to First Amendment prior restraint cases in analyzing Second Amendment claims to
gun licensing laws); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 461,478 (1995) (analogizing to free speech cases to understand the Second
Amendment).
The conventional approach among First Amendment scholars is to discuss the regulation
and design of speech technologies as free speech (or generic First Amendment) concerns.
Practically no discussion is devoted to the historical relevance of the freedom of the press to
restrictions on speech technologies, even in scholarship focusing on such technologies. See,
e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a DigitalAge, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
442-44 (2009) (discussing the importance of innovation and the development of information
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scholars have already started citing and analyzing Heller in discussions of the First
Amendment. 50 This discussion is a start in the right direction, but it needs to go
much further-and now in the opposite direction as well (considering the Second
Amendment in understanding the First). This section lays out the reasons why the
Supreme Court would benefit from consideration of Heller in analyzing the Free
Press Clause with a similar approach in looking to text and history to identify a core
protection of the Clause.
A. Paucity of Case Law Interpreting the Free Press Clause
One simple reason that Heller may provide helpful guidance for the Court in
future cases involving the Free Press Clause is that the Free Press Clause stands today
in many respects as the Second Amendment did pre-Heller. The precise meaning and
historical origin of the Free Press Clause remain largely unexamined in the Court's
jurisprudence.' Although the Court has considered far more First Amendment cases
than Second Amendment cases, the Court routinely analyzes First Amendment cases
under the Free Speech Clause or, more generically, "the First Amendment" or the Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses.'52 Only a few cases stand or fall on the Free Press
Clause alone, typically cases involving the rights of newspapers. "53 My aim is not
technology to free speech values). In short, the Free Press Clause is ignored. In this regard,
I disagree with Jack Balkin's recent prediction that future policy debates "will increasingly
shift to questions of design-both of institutions and technology-that are largely beyond
judicial competence" and ones that will be left to "legislatures, administrative agencies, and
technologists." Id. at 443-44. Balkin is right to suggest that technological design and innovation
are gaining increasing importance in First Amendment debates in our digital age. In my view,
however, the courts will have a vital role in these debates. For the best technology policy lies
in the Constitution itself-the Free Press Clause and its protection for speech technologies. That
clause, although long ignored, will become increasingly important, as will judicial review, as
Congress attempts to enact more pieces of legislation that target or restrict speech technologies
in the future.
so See, e.g., 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 1:1,
1:2, 1:4 (2008); Posting of Eugene Volokh to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
archives/archive_2008_08_10-2008 08 16.shtml#1218485530/(Aug. 11,2008, 17:37 EST).
j"j The Court's most extensive historical analysis of the Free Press Clause is found in two
concurring opinions, one by Justice Thomas and the other by the late Chief Justice Burger.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 359-60 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-802 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
152 See Lee, supra note 53, at 354 & n.263.
15' See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,227-28 (1987) (hold-
ing that a differential tax on magazines versus newspapers violated the Free Press Clause);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,582-83 (1983)
(finding that a use tax on paper and ink for publications violated the Free Press Clause); Okla.
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to suggest that these cases were wrongly decided, but instead, to argue that most of
the Court's cases have missed the technological side to the Free Press Clause, not
to mention one of the core abuses-the Crown's technology limits on the printing
press-that the Clause was designed to prevent. The Free Press Clause is not simply
a no prior restraint clause. Nor is it a clause only for newspapers. Given the paucity
of case law analyzing the Free Press Clause, the Court has a similar opportunity to
undertake a more exhaustive review of the Clause's origins as it did for the Second
Amendment in Heller.
As Akhil Amar and Cass Sunstein have both suggested (Amar favorably, Sunstein
only descriptively), originalism may be more likely an interpretive move when a court
Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (holding that a trial court order against
newspapers publishing the name or picture of a minor involved in a proceeding violated the
Free Press Clause); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding that a court
order against press disclosures in a criminal case was a prior restraint in violation of the Free
Press Clause); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,451-52 (1938) (finding that an ordinance
prohibiting leafleting without a permit violated the Free Press Clause); Grosjean v. Am. Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (finding that a state tax on advertisements affecting newspapers
violated the Free Press Clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (holding that
a state law allowing injunctions against future "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" news-
paper publications was a prior restraint in violation of the Free Press Clause).
The Court's more typical approach, particularly in modem times, is to avoid decisions
based solely on the Free Press Clause. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 107 (2003)
(rejecting for lack of standing a free press challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
164 (2002) (finding that a permit law for door-to-door advocacy violated the First Amend-
ment); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (denying
funding to a Christian student newspaper violated the Free Speech Clause); McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 357 (holding that a state prohibition on anonymous leafleting violated the freedom
of speech under the First Amendment); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636
(1994) ("Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment."); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984) (holding that a federal ban on edi-
torializing by noncommercial educational broadcasting stations violated the First Amendment);
Landmark Comm'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (holding that a state law forbid-
ding disclosure of information derived from proceedings before a state commission violated
the freedom of speech and freedom of the press); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
394 (1969) ("To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present rep-
resentative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes
of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,264 & n.4 (1964) (recognizing that
an actual malice standard of liability for defamation is required under the Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1960) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting anonymous handbills violated the freedom of speech and freedom of the press);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (finding that an ordinance against leafleting
violated the freedom of speech and freedom of press).
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is interpreting a provision with very few precedents. 154 By contrast, the possible
relevance of Heller to free press cases would be greatly diminished, if not fore-
closed, if the Court had already developed a long line of free press case law defining
its protection. In such a case, stare decisis may well counsel against considering a new
approach to the area of law, particularly if it conflicted with the well-established
precedent. That is not the case, however, with the Free Press Clause, which continues
to remain overshadowed by the Court's free speech (or "First Amendment") analysis.
B. Textual and Historical Parallels Between "Arms" and "Press"
The major substantive reason for considering Heller in interpreting the Free
Press Clause is the striking textual and historical parallels between the right to bear
arms and the freedom of the press. As detailed in greater depth above in Part II, the
right to bear arms and the freedom of the press are tied historically and textually.'55
Indeed, of all the provisions in the Constitution, the Framers included only two
for express protection of a technology. 156 Yet the two technologies they specified for
express protection-arms and the printing press-were probably the two most revo-
lutionary to the Framing generation. The latter was essential to spreading political
ideas, while the former, to physically defending oneself. Both protected people from
tyranny.5 7 Both were instrumental to the American revolution. 158 It is not hard to
imagine why the Framers singled out only these two technologies for constitutional
protection. Madison and his contemporaries spoke about the two rights in the same
breath, and often in similar ways describing them separately as private rights, the
"palladium of liberty," and necessary or essential to a "free state.' 59 Not surpris-
ingly, several state constitutions contemporaneous to the Framing had free press
clauses that were drafted similar to the Second Amendment's unique construction
in the Bill of Rights-i.e., with a justification or prefatory clause.160 Early drafts of
these two amendments to the Constitution also contained similarities in construction,
including placement consecutively. 16'
' See Amar, supra note 41, at 179 ("The first big opinion in a field, if done well, can lay
out the first principles of constitutional text, history, and structure, and an originalist/textualist
is well suited to that task."); Sunstein, supra note 4 ("In answering that question [of first
impression], many judges might be drawn to the original understanding even if they would
not consider it, or would not give it a great deal of weight, if they were writing on an unclean
slate."); id. at 250 ("Originalism seems to have more appeal when doctrine is not developed,
but the Court has rarely spoken in originalist terms even when doctrine barely exists.").
... See supra Part H.
'56 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
is8 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
i See supra notes 54-57, 68-73 and accompanying text.
16 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 64-67, 94-99 and accompanying text.
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What the text suggests the history confirms. The long history of abuses of the
British Crown in restricting these two technologies from the people shows the clear
connection between the right to bear arms and freedom of the press. 162 The Framers
loathed the Crown's attempts to deprive the people of these technologies as a way
to quell political and religious dissent. 63 Both clauses sought to end the core abuse
of the government depriving the people of technologies, whether arms or presses.
C. Identifying the Core Protections of the Free Press Clause
Another reason that the Heller decision is appropriate for the Court to consider
in free press cases is that Heller's approach is, in fact, very similar to how the Court
has already discussed the Free Press Clause, in those relatively few cases in which the
history of the Free Press Clause has come up. The Supreme Court has recognized
that a prepublication licensing requirement-a prior restraint-is a violation of the
First Amendment," reminiscent of the history of abuses of the British Crown under
the notorious Printing Acts. 65 As Justice Scalia explained:
The First Amendment's guarantee of "the freedom of speech, or
of the press" prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints
upon expression, but the core abuse against which it was directed
was the scheme of licensing laws implemented by the monarch
and Parliament to contain the "evils" of the printing press in
16th- and 17th-century England. The Printing Act of 1662 had
"prescribed what could be printed, who could print, and who
could sell."'"
It is striking that Justice Scalia speaks of a "core abuse," which is reminiscent of the
discussion of "core protection" in Heller. Elsewhere in its First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court has sought to protect its "core protections," in a manner strikingly
162 See supra Part II.B. 1.
163 See supra notes 107-08, 133-40 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958) ("It is settled by a long line
of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful
enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in
the discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the
enjoyment of those freedoms.").
165 Lee, supra note 53, at 320-21.
"6 Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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similar to the approach in Heller.167 (Likewise, for other clauses, the Court has sought
to identify and protect their "core protections."'' 68)
Although Justice Scalia correctly describes one core abuse of the Printing Acts
in the prepublication licensing (or prior restraint) scheme, another core abuse was the
restriction on the technology of the printing press itself. As Blackstone described
in his Commentaries, the Printing Acts "limited the number ... of presses."'' 69 In-
deed, the Acts attempted to decrease the total number of printing presses allowed in
England: nonconforming presses were considered contraband and subject to destruc-
tion by the Stationers' Company, which held not only legal control over the copyrights
to works, but also physical control over the permitted printing presses. 7 ' The tech-
nological restrictions in the Printing Acts were designed, in other words, to facilitate
the monopoly over publishing held by the Stationers' Company, the de facto copy-
right holders of the period. As copyright historian Mark Rose recounts, "censorship
and trade regulation became inextricable, and this was a marriage that was to endure
until the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710.' '
D. Caveats
This Part has attempted to present the case, at least a prima facie one, for consid-
ering Heller and its framework for the Second Amendment as persuasive authority
in interpreting the Free Press Clause. Several caveats are in order.
167 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) ("[T]he
category of speech regulated by the Ohio statute occupies the core of the protection afforded
by the First Amendment .. " (emphasis added)); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (recognizing that "speech of public concern is at the core of the First
Amendment's protections" (emphasis added)); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468
U.S. 364, 380 n. 13 (1984) (observing that the case involved "expression that is at the core
of First Amendment protections" (emphasis added)); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127
S. Ct. 2652, 2676 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment) ("The [Buckley v.
Valeo] Court began with the recognition that contributing money to, and spending money on
behalf of, political candidates implicates core FirstAmendmentprotections, and that restrictions
on such contributions and expenditures 'operate in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities."' (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976))).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,637 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
core protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a
criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,642 (1993)
("Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core
of that prohibition [under the Equal Protection Clause]."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970) ("Our own decisions seem to have recognized at an early date that it is this literal
right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause ....").
169 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *152.
170 Lee, supra note 53, at 321-23; see also supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
171 ROSE, supra note 127, at 13.
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1. On History and Text
As with any historical account of the Framing, my historical discussion of (i) how
the Free Press Clause developed partly in response to the Copyright Clause and (ii) how
the freedom of the press relates to the right to bear arms cannot be proven with cer-
tainty. I have tried to discern the most plausible understanding of the "freedom of
the press" based on the text of the Constitution and the historical materials discuss-
ing the concept in seventeenth-century England and then later in the early Republic.
Although not definitive, the historical evidence on the connection between the Free
Press and Copyright Clauses is, in my view, weighty. Several Framers and their con-
temporaries spoke for or against the need for the Free Press Clause specifically in
relationship to copyright or the Copyright Clause. 172 The history of copyright and the
freedom of the press in England, which informed the Framers, confirms the close con-
nection between the freedom of the press and copyright. 73 While the amount of
historical materials drawing a connection between the freedom of the press and the
right to bear arms may be more modest, it is significant that Madison and several of
his contemporaries commonly referred to both in the same breath while discussing
individual rights. 1
74
While I have stressed the textual similarities, a few textual differences are worth
mentioning. The First Amendment speaks of a "freedom," while the Second Amend-
ment speaks of a "right," although it is not clear what, if any, significance to attribute
to the difference in wording.'7 5 Given the parallel construction in earlier drafts of the
Bill of Rights equating the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms both as indi-
vidual rights that "shall not be infringed," the Framers likely understood "freedom"
and "right" as synonymous in the Bill of Rights. 76 Also, while I have made modest
note of the consecutive placement of the two clauses, one should not read too much
into the placement. There are multiple clauses, not just the Free Press Clause, in the
First Amendment, and that the Framers chose not to include the freedom of the press
and the right to bear arms in the very same amendment provides some reason to
question treating them in a completely equivalent manner.
177
2. On Constitutional Interpretation
Of course, the Free Press Clause is independent of the Second Amendment and
serves its own purpose. It would be foolish to argue that the Court should adopt the
172 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
173 See supra Part II.B.2.
17 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
17' Tushnet, supra note 41 (manuscript at 5).
176 Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Aug. 24, 1789, reprinted in THE ORIGIN
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 63, at 706-07.
177 For further discussion of the possible weight to give adjoining or non-adjoining clauses
in the Constitution from an intratextualist view, see Amar, supra note 80, at 765, 796.
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identical approach, jot-for-jot, for both clauses, or that the precedents interpreting
one clause are somehow direct precedent for the other clause. My argument is not that
the Court should apply a type of "Second Amendment" analysis to the Free Press
Clause, or that Heller should be read as a Free Press Clause precedent. Nor am I sug-
gesting that the Court should abandon its existing First Amendment jurisprudence,
or go back to the antiquated (common law) view of its freedoms as protecting only
against prior restraints. Instead, I argue that Heller can provide a helpful reference
point for the Court when it considers restrictions on technologies under the Free Press
Clause. Such an approach is particularly useful in reviewing governmental restrictions
on technology today that are analogous to a core abuse of the British Crown that con-
cerned the Framers, such as, paradigmatically, the government depriving the people
of guns or speech technologies.
Finally, I am not advocating for the adoption of "originalism" as a general or
exclusive matter in interpreting the Constitution. That issue has been the topic of
intense debate among constitutional law scholars, which goes well beyond the scope
of this Article.'78 The Court's own First Amendment jurisprudence-with different
levels of scrutiny for content-based versus content-neutral regulations-could hardly
be called originalist today. 79 My goal here is not to defend originalism as a general
theory of interpretation. Nor is it to jettison the Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence. Instead, it is to show that the history of the Free Press Clause is important to
understanding its meaning, especially because the case law is so underdeveloped
today. Although history is often contestable, and lawyers and judges may not be the
best historians by certain academic standards, ignoring history in interpreting the
Constitution is even worse. As Professor Tribe aptly noted, "it would be hard to find
any school of thought about the interpretation of constitutional language or structure
that would dismiss history's claims as simply beside the point. '18°
IV. DOES HELLER SHOOT DOWN CONGRESS'S ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT SPEECH
TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH COPYRIGHT LAW?
This final Part examines the practical importance of Heller for copyright laws that
attempt to restrict speech technologies. Applying an approach similar to Heller to in-
terpret the Free Press Clause, this Part examines three copyright restrictions of speech
technologies: (i) the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), (ii) the pro-
posed "broadcast flag" bill, and (iii) the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1992 (DMCA). Under this approach, AHRA and the
"broadcast flag" bill both likely violate a core protection of the Free Press Clause by
.7. For a recent symposium on originalism, see Symposium, Symposium Essays on
Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871 (2008).
119 Cf Tushnet, supra note 41 (manuscript at 8) (discussing prior restraint understanding).
"s TRIBE, supra note 81, at 66.
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banning certain speech technologies that can be used for self-expression, whereas
the DMCA probably passes muster.
A. The Heller Framework and the Core Protection of the Second Amendment
Although Heller stopped short of providing a definitive test for the Second
Amendment, it did suggest a broad outline of how the Court might review gun con-
trol laws in the future. The framework can be characterized as follows: (i) Does the
instrument restricted fall within the scope of protected "arms" under the Second
Amendment, and (ii) if so, does the governmental restriction in question violate a
core protection of the Amendment (as historically or originally understood), such
as the right of citizens "to use arms in defense of hearth and home"? 1 '
1. Types of Arms Protected by the Second Amendment
First, there is the threshold question of whether the weapon in question falls
within the Second Amendment right. The Heller Court indicated that the Second
Amendment extends "prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,"
including modern weapons that did not exist at the time of the Framing.182 However,
interpreting its decision in Miller, the Court suggested in dictum that a weapon (such
as a sawed-off shotgun) does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment if
it is "not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as
short-barreled shotguns.' 83 The weapons must be "in common use at the time," able
to be used at home, and not "dangerous and unusual weapons.""'
Applying this test, the Court easily found that handguns fall within the ambit of the
Second Amendment: "handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans
for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid."'85
2. The Core Protection(s) of the Second Amendment
The second inquiry is whether the restriction or law in question impermissibly
restricts the Second Amendment right to bear arms, assuming the weapon falls
within the right. For this question, the Court declined to articulate a specific level
of scrutiny. 86
Instead, analogizing to free speech protections, the Court suggested that there
is a "core protection" embodied in the Second Amendment that "takes out of the hands
1 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
182 Id. at 2792.
183 Id. at 2816 (emphasis added).
'84 Id. at 2817.
15 Id. at 2818.
186 Id. at 2821.
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of government--even the Third Branch of Government-the power to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon."''8 7 Thus, "what-
ever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home."'
88
Thus, once a core protection is identified, government restrictions that interfere with
the individual's ability to exercise her rights within that core are unconstitutional.
The Court did acknowledge, however, it will likely have to determine in the
future how the historical exceptions to the right to bear arms (such as denials of gun
ownership to felons) fit in. 189 The Court stopped short of articulating a test for how
exceptions to the Second Amendment right should be analyzed.190 Lower courts have
accepted the historical exceptions noted in Heller as valid exceptions to the Second
Amendment right, and have begun to judge the validity of other exceptions by com-
paring them to Heller's noted historical exceptions.' 9'
Applying its "core protection" approach, the Court easily found unconstitutional
both (i) D.C.'s gun control law banning gun possession in the home (by disallowing
registration), and (ii) D.C.'s law requiring firearms in the home to "be disassembled
or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering them inoperable."' 192 Both provisions
violated the core protection of the Second Amendment in preserving the right of the
people to use guns in the home for self-defense.
B. Proposed Framework: Core Protections of the Free Press Clause
For the reasons explained above, the general interpretive method of Heller-in
looking to the text and history of the Second Amendment to determine its original
meaning and "core protection" consistent with the Framing era-provides a helpful
mode of analysis for understanding the Free Press Clause. 93
The basic framework for the Free Press Clause is: (i) Does the speech technol-
ogy restricted fall within the protection of "press" under the Free Press Clause, and
(ii) if so, does the governmental restriction in question violate a core protection of
the Amendment (as historically or originally understood) that should not be subject
to interest-balancing or case-by-case analysis."9
If a law violates a core protection of the Free Press Clause, then the restriction is
per se unconstitutional. The whole point of Justice Scalia's admonition in Heller is
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
9' See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163-64 (D. Me. 2008).
192 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-20.
193 See supra Parts II & Ill.
'94 Cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,444,447 (1991) (holding that cable television
stations are considered "press" for First Amendment purposes, but a state tax statute did not
violate First Amendment protections).
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to keep the core protection immune from interest-balancing, or case-by-case analysis. 9 5
However, if the restriction does not violate a core protection, the Court should consider
whether the restriction nevertheless imposes a burden on speech that can withstand
the relevant First Amendment scrutiny under the Court's established precedents.'96
1. Types of Speech Technologies Protected by Free Press Clause
The Court has already taken a very expansive view of what speech technologies
fall within the notion of the "press."' 97 "The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."'' 98 For example, the Court has stated that "moving pictures, like newspa-
pers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment."'" Add to the list both cable TV and the Interet.200 As the Heller
Court itself reminded, "the First Amendment protects modem forms of communica-
tion."20' Although these several examples of speech technologies were all revolu-
tionary at one time, the technologies can be as mundane as loud speakers and still
fall within the First Amendment's ambit.2 2
95 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. One could imagine also recognizing a category of
"historical exceptions" to the Free Press Clause right in a fashion similar to how the Court
recognized for the Second Amendment. However, I doubt this category is particularly rele-
vant or useful for speech technologies because "historical exceptions" do not appear to have
arisen in this context. To my knowledge, historically, people were not deprived of or dis-
qualified by law from owning a printing press due to a felony conviction or other factors. It
is interesting to note that women participated in the print business in the early 1800s. See
California Historical SocietylExhibits/EventslPast Exhibits, Women in Printing & Publishing
in California: 1850-1940, http://www .californiahistoricalsociety.org/exhibits/pastexhibits/
women/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). Except for perhaps the licensing of the radio spectrum,
see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)-an approach that is the subject
of mounting and intense criticism, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245,266-306 (2003)-
the government has not historically or typically attempted to control or restrict ownership of
speech technologies (as has been the case with guns). Therefore, I think it is appropriate to
follow a different approach than Heller on the issue of exceptions.
196 To borrow Randy Barnett's description, when the original meaning does not address
the issue with sufficient specificity (constitutional interpretation), the court must nevertheless
engage in constitutional construction "to adopt a construction of the text that is consistent
with its original meaning but not deducible from it." BARNETr, supra note 29, at 121.
"9 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
198 Id.
'99 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
200 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (Internet); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (plurality opinion) (cable).
201 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008) (emphasis added).
202 See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948).
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2. The Core Protection(s) of the Free Press Clause in Safeguarding Speech
Technologies
A core protection of the Free Press Clause is to protect speech technologies-
especially those that directly enable, like the printing press, the widespread dissemina-
tion of speech-from government restrictions through copyright law, such as (i) limits
on the total number of speech technologies that can be made, sold, and distributed
to the public, (ii) limits on the ownership of such technologies, or (iii) the remedial
powers that enabled the confiscation and destruction of non-approved presses as
contraband. 20 3 Bans on speech technologies, such as a ban on unapproved printing
presses, are the most constitutionally suspect.
This core protection of the Free Press Clause has, for too long, been overlooked.
As I have explained in greater depth elsewhere, the freedom of speech and the free-
dom of the press protect two separate, but related rights-just as the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses do in the First Amendment as well. 204 "While the freedom
of speech protects an individual's basic right of expression, the freedom of the press
is meant to ensure that speech technologies are free of governmental control," espe-
cially restrictions effectuated under copyright law. 25
Indeed, the debate over the Free Press Clause between the Anti-Federalists and
Federalists centered specifically on the Copyright Clause, and whether copyright could
be used to effectuate controls on the printing press in ways similar to the abuses of the
Printing Acts in England. 2 6 James Iredell, a leading Federalist from North Carolina
and later Supreme Court Justice, argued that the Copyright Clause gave Congress
"no other authority over this than to secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive
privilege of publishing their works," similar to the limited form of copyright under the
Statute of Anne in England.2 7 Yet that argument was not able to assuage the Anti-
Federalists and the fervor for protecting the freedom of the press expressly in the Bill
of Rights. The Anti-Federalists feared that the Copyright Clause itself could be used
as a power to restrict the press, a sentiment that was understandable given the many
abuses of the Crown under the Printing Acts that served the copyright holders' inter-
ests in England.208 Though a Federalist, Madison eventually agreed that a Bill of
Rights, including a free press clause, was necessary and offered the first proposal for
the amendments in the First Congress.20 9 Later, Madison wrote of the necessity for
the Free Press Clause: "the article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress
203 See supra Part II.B.2.
204 Lee, supra note 53, at 339-51.
o Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 331-36.
207 IREDELL, supra note 138, at 361.
208 See Lee, supra note 53, at 334; supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
209 See RICHARD LABuNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BnIL OF
RIGHTS 191-92 (2006).
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a power that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged,
was meant as a positive denial to Congress of any power whatever on the subject.,2 10
Thus, the original meaning of the Free Press Clause included an overriding distrust
of governmental restrictions on the technology of the printing press, especially those
effectuated through copyright law or in the service of copyright holders.
That the Framers, at the urging of the Anti-Federalists, eventually felt the need
to add the Free Press Clause to the Constitution indicates their uneasiness with the
Copyright Clause, which was modeled in part on the Statute of Anne.2 1' Although the
Statute of Anne did establish in England a less restrictive system of copyright that did
not contain either the licensing requirement or the technology limits of the repressive
Printing Acts, nothing in the Statute of Anne expressly forbade the Printing Acts from
being resurrected and imposing licensing and technology restrictions in the future.212
The same could be said-and was said during the Framing--of the Copyright Clause. 3
The Free Press Clause effectively filled that potential hole in the Copyright Clause
by directly limiting Congress's power to restrict speech technologies through copy-
right law.214
C. Do Congress's Attempts to Regulate Technologies Through Copyright Law
Violate the Free Press Clause?
The Supreme Court has yet to discuss this important part of the origin of the
Free Press Clause, perhaps understandably. To date, the Supreme Court has not ever
reviewed a free press or First Amendment challenge to a copyright restriction on a
technology.2 5 However, the Court will likely entertain such a challenge in the near
future. Congress has already restricted speech technologies through copyright law
210 JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 143 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralper Lemer eds., 1987) (emphasis
added).
211 Statute of Anne, supra note 125.
212 id.
213 Lee, supra note 53, at 334.
214 See TUCKER, supra note 71, at app. 13 ("But although this negative establishment may
satisfy the subjects of England, the people of America have not thought proper to suffer the
freedom of speech, and of the press to rest upon an uncertain foundation, as the will and
pleasure of the government.").
215 The Supreme Court in the Sony case skirted around the First Amendment problem of
banning the video recorder under secondary liability in copyright law by recognizing the
Sony safe harbor, which protects technologies that are capable of substantial noninfringing
uses from being the basis for liability. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417,442 (1984). Elsewhere, I have explained how the Sony safe harbor operates as a First
Amendment safeguard within copyright law (analogous to fair use and the idea-expression
dichotomy) in order to protect free press interests and the development of speech technologies.
Lee, supra note 53, at 370-79.
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on a few occasions and is considering even further restrictions, although this devel-
opment is a late twentieth-century phenomenon. For over two hundred years, dating
back to the First Congress and the first Copyright Act, the traditional contours of our
copyright laws avoided any direct restriction on speech technologies. 21 6 That long-held
tradition has begun to change, with intense lobbying of copyright industries to regu-
late technologies. Congress's increasing efforts to regulate speech technologies as a
way to protect copyrights make it likely the Supreme Court will eventually have to con-
sider a free press challenge to such a restriction. Below I apply the "core protection"
analysis of the Free Press Clause to three different restrictions on speech technolo-
gies enacted or proposed by copyright holders in the past twenty years. The first two
restrictions, AHRA and the broadcast flag, both likely violate a core protection of
the Free Press Clause, while the third restriction, the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provision, probably does not.
1. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
Under the "core protection" framework of the Free Press Clause, the technology
restriction under AHRA is very likely unconstitutional. Enacted in 1992 as a com-
promise between media and electronics industries over the digital audio tape (DAT),
AHRA has had very little practical impact due to the failure of the DAT in the market-
place. Because there are so few cases involving AHRA or DAT technologies, it is not
surprising that AHRA has never been challenged in a lawsuit as violating the Free
Press Clause.2 7 Nonetheless, the question is worthy of consideration, even if for only
academic reasons.
AHRA forbids the importation, manufacture, or distribution of any digital audio
recording device that does not contain the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS),
a system devised by copyright holders and the recording industry to prohibit unau-
thorized serial copying of copyrighted tapes.218 Although SCMS allows copies to
be made from an original copyrighted tape on a DAT machine, people cannot copy
from any of the copies because the SCMS does not permit serial copying, even if for
legitimate purpose. 2'9 AHRA does contain an exemption for "the noncommercial
use by a consumer of such a [digital audio recording] device or medium for making
216 See Lee, supra note 53, at 350-53.
217 Indeed, no reported case discussing AHRA has ever involved the failed DAT technology
(as opposed to later technologies not consisting of the DAT). See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that AHRA does not apply to
"downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives"); Recording Indus. Ass'n. of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an MP3
player was not a digital audio recording device within scope of AHRA).
211 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
219 See Hyangsun Lee, The Audio Broadcast Flag System-Can It Be a Solution?, 12
COMM. L. & POL'Y 405,453 (2007).
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digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings," but this exemption is
undercut because it does not give technology developers the right to manufacture
any digital audio recording devices that do not prevent serial copying.22
If we apply our proposed framework, AHRA likely violates a core protection of
the Free Press Clause. First, tape recorders are clearly a form of speech technology
that falls within the scope of the Free Press Clause. Tape recorders effectively func-
tion as a printing press for capturing and distributing sound and audio. Like the press,
the recorders take speech and reproduce it mechanically for greater dissemination of
the speech. Even before the DAT, tape recorders were commonly used in homes and
businesses, including for legitimate purposes.
Second, AHRA transgresses a core protection of the Free Press Clause by banning
a speech technology. AHRA uses copyright law to impose a complete ban on any
non-complying digital audio recording device that does not implement the recording
industry's own copyright control measures.22" ' The ban on the importation, manufac-
ture, or distribution of any non-conforming digital audio recording device effectively
gives the recording industry control over the design of an entire speech technology.
Copyright holders can seek impoundment and destruction of any nonconforming
device, not to mention damages.222
AHRA is thus the functional equivalent of the Printing Acts. Under AHRA, the
prepublication licensing system and technology limits of the Printing Acts are effec-
tively implanted into the make-up of the technology itself. SCMS operates as a tech-
nological Stationers' Company of sorts within the digital audio recording device itself,
imposing controls over what expression can be reproduced by the technology. AHRA
bans all digital tape technology not approved by copyright holders, reminiscent of how
the Printing Acts banned unregistered or unapproved presses not controlled by the
Stationers' Company.
On its face, AHRA's ban on non-conforming speech technologies violates a core
protection of the Free Press Clause. People are deprived of digital audio technologies
that can facilitate their self-expression, even potentially in ways that do not infringe
any copyrights. To draw an analogy to Heller, the SCMS restriction on digital audio
tapes functions like the "trigger lock" requirement for handguns found unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. Just as the trigger lock requirement did to guns, SCMS
renders inoperable the serial copying of digital tapes on all digital audio tape tech-
nologies, regardless if the copying is for legitimate purpose, such as fair use or other
valid forms of self-expression.223
220 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
221 Id. § 1002.
222 Id. § 1009(0, (g).
223 Cf District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008) (holding that a
trigger lock requirement violates core protections of the Second Amendment).
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2. Proposed "Broadcast Flag" Bill
In 2002, Congress considered an even more sweeping technological mandate
under the so-called "broadcast flag" bill proposed by then-Senator Ernest "Fritz"
Hollings. 2' Although the bill was abandoned due to intense opposition from the
computer and consumer electronic industries, it is still useful to examine the bill,
which the copyright industries may attempt to revive one day.225
Essentially, the "broadcast flag" bill sought to do the same sort of thing that
AHRA attempted to do for the failed DAT technology-i.e., first, to require devices
to contain prescribed technological measures to reduce copyright infringement facil-
itated by those devices, and then, second, to ban all non-conforming speech technol-
ogies.226 The "broadcast flag" bill was far more sweeping than AHRA and applied
basically to every device or technology capable of playing digital content.227
Under the bill, all nonconforming devices or technologies made after the effective
date of the law would be categorically banned. 22' The bill incorporated the remedies
from the provisions of the DMCA,229 which recognize the power of the court to issue
injunctions "on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation,
but in no event shall impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected
under the 1 st amendment to the Constitution. 23°
One difficulty of analyzing the "broadcast flag" bill is that it left the key compo-
nent-the actual "broadcast flag" or copyright control measure mandated-for future
determination either by agreement of "representatives of digital media device manu-
facturers, consumer groups, and copyright owners" subject to the FCC rule-making
process, or, failing such agreement, directly by FCC rule making.23' Essentially, the
bill punted the most difficult issue.
Nonetheless, perhaps in an attempt to avoid potential constitutional problems of
restricting all digital technologies, the bill included the following provision:
224 Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong.
(2002).
225 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 125 (2004).
226 S. 2048 §§ 3, 5.
227 Id. § 5 ("digital media device"). The bill defined "digital media device" as:
any hardware or software that-
(A) reproduces copyrighted works in digital form;
(B) converts copyrighted works in digital form into a form whereby
the images and sounds are visible or audible; or
(C) retrieves or accesses copyrighted works in digital form and trans-
fers or makes available for transfer such works to hardware or software
described in subparagraph (B).
Id. § 9.
228 Id. § 5.
229 Id. § 7.
230 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1) (2006).
231 S. 2048 § 3.
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(1) LIMITATIONS ON THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF COPY-
RIGHT OWNERS. In achieving the goal of promoting as many
lawful uses of copyrighted works as possible, while preventing
as much infringement as possible, the encoding rules shall take
into account the limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright
owners, including the fair use doctrine.
(2) PERSONAL USE COPIES. No person may apply a security
measure that uses a standard security technology to prevent a
lawful recipient from making a personal copy for lawful use in
the home of programming at the time it is lawfully performed, on
an over-the-air broadcast, premium or non-premium cable channel,
or premium or non-premium satellite channel, by a television
broadcast station (as defined in section 122(j)(5)(A) of title 17,
United States Code), a cable system (as defined in section 111 (f)
of such tifle), or a satellite carrier (as defined in section 119(d)(6)
of such title).232
It is doubtful that these provisions save the "broadcast" flag bill from being un-
constitutional. The first provision is merely advisory: it advises that the eventual rule
should "take into account" fair use and other limitations on the exclusive rights of
copyright holders. "Take into account" does not necessarily mean "fully protect or
preserve" the ability of people to engage in legitimate fair use or free speech activ-
ities. Secondly, the "personal use copy" is limited to lawful home copying of only
programmed television content; it does not establish a general exception or right for
all personal use copies on digital media devices, even if they are lawful and fall out-
side the scope of copyright. A large and growing amount of TV content, however, is
now distributed on the Internet and would appear to fall outside the bill's exception
for personal use copies.
Moreover, the FCC has already tried once--on its own initiative, which the D.C.
Circuit invalidated as falling outside of the FCC' s statutory authority-to devise a
"broadcast flag" rule.233 That rule required a digital code to be "embedded in a DTV
broadcasting stream, which prevents digital television reception equipment from re-
distributing broadcast content," regardless of whether the redistribution would have
been legitimate or supported, for example, by fair use.234
If we apply our two-part test from above, the "broadcast flag" bill appears very
likely to violate a core protection of the Free Press Clause. First, there is no question
232 Id. § 3(e).
233 See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
234 Id. at 691; Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 73, 76).
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the "broadcast flag" bill regulates speech technologies (e.g., digital television, com-
puters, software, and every "digital media device") that are protected by the Free Press
Clause. Indeed, the scope of the broadcast flag bill is absolutely breathtaking: it regu-
lates virtually all digital-content technologies known to humankind. Second, although
a final determination of the bill's constitutionality cannot be made until the particular
"broadcast flag" rule is specified, the whole idea of banning all digital technologies
that do not include measures prescribed by the copyright industries raises a huge con-
stitutional red flag. The Framers would have been profoundly skeptical of Congress
adopting bans on speech technologies (such as unauthorized presses or, here, unautho-
rized digital technologies) to serve copyright holders' interests, for that kind of tech-
nology restriction is precisely what led to all the abuses under the British Crown, an
experience eventually prompting the Framers to recognize the freedom of the press
in the Bill of Rights.235
3.The DMCA Anti-circumvention Provision
The DMCA provides a final example to consider.236 Enacted in 1998, the
DMCA anti-circumvention provision is a very complicated set of laws that provide
legal protections for copyright holders' efforts to deploy technologies, such as digital
rights management (DRM), on their copyrighted works, in order to reduce the amount
of copyright infringement of their works, especially through digital technologies.237
Given the complexity of the DMCA, a brief summary of the key aspects of the law
is necessary.23
The DMCA makes it illegal (i) to circumvent access- and copying-control
measures (i.e., DRM), such as encryption, placed by copyright holders on their works,
and (ii) to make or traffic in circumventing technologies that facilitate the circum-
vention of such copyright control measures.2 39 In the so-called "no mandate" section,
235 See Lee, supra note 53, at 321-25.
236 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
237 Id.
238 1 focus on the main part of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision in § 1201(a) and
(b); these two subsections have generated the most controversy. The DMCA contains another
interesting subsection, § 1201(k), which is often overlooked, but which requires that analog
VCR and video devices use the "automatic gain control copy control technology" and the
"four-line colorstripe copy control technology." Id. § 1201(k). The technology-mandate
provision, however, is mollified because it also bars entities from using these two copy controls
(developed by Macrovision) to stop consumer copying of TV shows on VCRs, except in very
limited circumstances, such as pay-per-view or video-on-demand. See id. § 1201(k)(2);
Bruce G. Joseph, Copyright Issues on the Internet, the DMCA and Technological Protection
Measures, 830 PLI/PAT 483, 512 (2005). Whether or not this technology mandate violates the
Free Press Clause, I leave for future inquiry. Because the VHS has been eclipsed by DVDs
and DVRs, the examination of this legal issue has become, like the VHS, somewhat obsolete.
239 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
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the DMCA makes clear that it does not mandate technology companies to adopt any
technological designs or copyright control measures. 2 °
There are a host of narrow exemptions for reverse engineering, security testing,
law enforcement, and other defined purposes, and an administrative rule-making
process before the Librarian of Congress (upon recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights) by which interested parties may seek to obtain a three-year exemption
from the basic proscription against the act of circumvention, in order to make legiti-
mate, noninfringing uses of a class of copyrighted works.24'
The DMCA anti-circumvention provision also states, "Nothing in this section
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, includ-
ing fair use, under this title. ''242 The Second Circuit, however, has rejected the argu-
ment that people can circumvent DRM in order to make a fair use; in the court's view,
there is no "fair use" for circumventing access-controls protected by the DMCA.243
The DMCA also recognizes, "Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish
any rights of free speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, tele-
communications, or computing products." 244 But the Second Circuit has read this
provision, too, as being merely "precatory" and imposing no limitation on the rest
of the DMCA anti-circumvention provision.24
Courts in three different cases have considered First Amendment challenges to
the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision; all have concluded that the law is consti-
tutional based on an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny.246 None of these
cases involved a challenge specifically under the Free Press Clause.247 All were de-
cided as First Amendment challenges to the DMCA's restriction on the computer code
contained in a circumventing software program, and its related burden on the ability
of people to make a fair or other legitimate use of a copyrighted work that is protected
by DRM, which cannot be legally circumvented under the DMCA. 48
If we apply our framework to the DMCA, the anti-circumvention law does not
appear to offend a core protection of the Free Press Clause. Therefore, whether it
offends some other protection of the Clause is more appropriate for intermediate
24 Id. § 1201(c)(3).
241 Id. § 1201(a), (d)-(k).
242 Id. § 1201(c)(1).
243 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2001).
244 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(4) (emphasis added).
245 Corley, 273 F.3d at 444.
246 See id. at 449-59; 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1128-37
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
247 Corley, 273 F.3d at 455-59; 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1099; Elcom, 203 F. Supp.
2d at 1122.
241 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 453-59; 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1099-1100; Elcom,
203 F. Supp. 2d at 1125-26.
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scrutiny and consideration of the governmental interests served by the restriction and
whether the restriction is narrowly tailored (an inquiry I do not undertake here).
First, it is debatable whether circumventing technologies fall within the kind of
speech technologies at the core protection of the Free Press Clause. On the one hand,
circumventing technologies typically do not themselves publish, copy, or dissemi-
nate speech for people to enjoy. Instead, circumventing technologies are often used
to unlock the technological protection, such as encryption, placed on copyrighted
works. On the other hand, circumventing technologies can be used as a secondary
tool to help facilitate free speech activities, such as legitimate copying and dissemi-
nation of a work that is encrypted with DRM (e.g., a movie on a DVD). Yet circum-
venting technologies (i.e., the specific features that enable circumvention) are not
typically the instruments themselves for publishing or copying as the printing press
itself was.249
Second, even assuming that circumventing technologies do fall within the Free
Press Clause's protection, it is not clear whether banning such circumventing technol-
ogies violates a core protection of the Clause. The ban on circumventing technologies
does not necessarily take away from the public any technologies that themselves pro-
duce or disseminate speech. The clearest historical abuse in England involved the
government ban on unapproved presses, the machines of mass publication. However,
in the case of the DMCA' s ban on circumventing technologies-i.e., technologies
that unlock the encryption locks on copyrighted works, no machine of mass publication
is itself banned. For example, people can still use their computers and the Internet,
the technologies by which circumventing technologies are often utilized, to copy and
publish many different things. True, the copy function of a computer may be ren-
dered effectively inoperable (to the extent the computer does not have access to the
underlying work in a way that allows copying) for an encrypted work, such as a DVD
movie, even curbing legitimate fair uses of the work. But the general functionality
of computers to copy material still exists, and the DMCA does not require computer
manufacturers or other technology developers to adopt copyright control measures
in their speech technologies.
Unlike AHRA's direct restriction on digital recorders, or the broadcast flag's
direct restriction on digital media devices, the DMCA' s restriction on circumventing
technologies is arguably one step removed from speech technologies that themselves
produce or disseminate speech. Consequently, it is difficult to find a historical ana-
logue for this context.2 ° One might analogize encryption to a kind of special ink
249 One could imagine a circumventing technology that came equipped with extra functions
for publishing and copying. In such case, the circumventing features would still present a
circumstance different from the acts of printing or copying analogous to the printing press.
25O By contrast, to the extent the proposed broadcast flag would regulate the Internet, the
Internet functions very much like the printing press in enabling mass publication. See generally
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) ("From the publishers' point of view, [the Internet]
constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of
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used by copyright holders in the printing press; the ink can prevent the printed
material from being copied by others, say, on a copy machine (if one existed back
then). If someone had developed a way to circumvent the special ink and make
copies of printed materials without authorization of the copyright holder, the inven-
tion (call it a "special ink decrypter") would be a circumventing technology similar
to the ones banned by the DMCA. Would the Framers or Framing generation have
considered a ban on the special ink decrypter in the same way as a ban on unapproved
printing presses?
Hard to say. This contrary-to-fact hypothetical-not to mention, anachronism-
presents a scenario that strains historical comparisons. Consequently, I think the issue
is better analyzed under the well-established test of First Amendment scrutiny, as the
courts have done so far, which can take into account a balancing of interests. 251
D. Summary
It bears repeating that I am not suggesting that the First and Second Amendment
should be treated exactly the same. That would be foolish. However, for too long,
courts have avoided exploring the history of the Free Press Clause and grappling with
its meaning in First Amendment cases. The Free Press Clause is not a dead letter,
but it does remain like a long lost cousin to the more often discussed Free Speech
Clause. Just as the Second Amendment stood pre-Heller, the Free Press Clause stands
today largely unexamined. This predicament will become increasingly untenable as
Congress considers imposing direct restrictions on speech technologies through or
in service of copyright law. If such a restriction is challenged one day, as I believe is
likely, Heller provides a useful approach for the Court to consider in examining the
Free Press Clause head-on.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the Supreme Court's landmark Second Amendment
ruling in Heller and its possible effect on future cases brought under the Free Press
Clause. Based on the text and history of the Constitution, the connection between
the two Clauses is undeniable, as the Heller Court itself repeatedly suggested. Only
two provisions in the entire Constitution protect individual rights to a technology:
the Second Amendment's right to bear "arms" and the Free Press Clause's right to
the freedom of the "press," meaning the printing press. Both rights were viewed as
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a
computer connected to the Internet can 'publish' information.").
251 It goes beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the DMCA under intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny or the respective decisions of the courts thus far. My inquiry focuses
on the core protection of the Free Press Clause.
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pre-existing, natural rights to the Framing generation and were each separately called
the "palladium of liberty" during the Framing. Both rights developed in reaction to
the Crown's abuses in restricting the respective technology in England during the
seventeenth century. Given this historical and textual connection, courts should
consider applying an approach similar to the one in Heller in interpreting the Free
Press Clause. Just as Heller held that banning handguns for the purpose of gun control
violates the Second Amendment's core protection of an individual's right to possess
arms for self-defense, Congress's bans on speech technologies for the purpose of copy-
right control may well violate the Free Press Clause's core protection of technologies
for self-expression.
